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The Somalia-based militant group, Al Shabaab, has conducted mass casualty transnational 
terrorist attacks and has become a regional security threat. In an effort to uncover the best 
explanation of the drivers behind the group’s use of transnational terror, a critical analysis of 
Rational Choice Theory, Spill-over Conflict Theory and Regional War Complex Theory was 
conducted. Evaluating each theory according to whether its assumptions held true, the theory 
offered a parsimonious explanation of Al Shabaab’s use of transnational terror which could 
be supported by at least three types of evidence, the strengths and weaknesses of each theory, 
with regard to explaining Al Shabaab’s transnational terror were identified. The findings 
showed that Al Shabaab as a transnational actor should not be seen as a linear transformation 
of the group, moving outwards from Somalia, but connected to an interlinked web between 
countries in the Horn of Africa, where domestic vulnerabilities such as political and socio-
economic marginalisation and a vulnerability to radicalisation allow for the cross-pollination 
of intent, and the capabilities to carry out attacks. As such, the regional and international inter-
connections captured by the Regional War Complex offered the best explanation of the drivers 
of Al Shabaab’s use of transnational terror. Although Rational Choice Theory most clearly 
highlighted Al Shabaab’s intent to transform from a domestic actor to a regional one, and the 
Spill-over Model showed that refugees could offer a recruitment source, it was the increased 
regional capabilities through the establishment of affiliates located outside of Somalia which 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Defining the research problem  
With the Somalia-based militant group, Al Shabaab1, carrying out attacks outside of its primary 
areas of operation in Somalia, specifically in Kenya, Djibouti and Uganda, it is evident that the 
group has become a regional security threat and it is necessary to explore Al Shabaab’s use of 
transnational terror.2 
 
Harakat Shabaab Al Mujahidin (Al Shabaab) first emerged in Somalia as the militant wing of 
the then-political body, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), around 2003. Amid the protracted 
conflict in the country, the militant wing formally split from the Islamic Courts after the UIC’s 
defeat by Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces and Ethiopian troops in 2006.3 Al 
Shabaab’s principal objective at the time was to establish a Wahhabi Caliphate4 in Somalia by 
way of insurgency against the TFG forces, Ethiopia and, later, troops of the African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).5 Despite being driven from Mogadishu in 2011 by AMISOM 
forces, Al Shabaab has maintained a strong operational presence in Somalia, sustaining 
strongholds in southern and central regions of the country, and has continued to battle against 
the subsequent Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), which replaced the TFG in August 
2012. The group has carried out attacks outside of Somalia while simultaneously adopting a 
more transnational-focused rhetoric circulated through websites, audio recordings and via 
social media. In statements released in 2011, the group declared war against Kenya and has 
                                                 
1 Although the author recognises alternative spellings, ‘Al Shabaab’ has been selected for the purpose of this 
dissertation. This version has been selected as it is among the most common spellings used in available English 
literature on the subject.  
2 For further evidence of this, see recent attacks in Kenya (most significantly, the September 2013 attack against 
the Westgate shopping complex in Kenya’s capital, Nairobi), as well as in Djibouti City on 25 May 2014 and 
threats made in a statement by prominent Al Shabaab commander, Fuad Mohamed Khalaf, on 22 May warning 
of further attacks in Kenya and elsewhere.  
3 Jonathan Masters, “Al-Shabaab”, Council on Foreign Relations, 23 September 2011, accessed 4 April 2015, 
www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650  
4 An Islamic state led by a supreme leader, based on the extremist principals of the Wahhabi movement. 
Evidence of this can be found in Hansen, Stig Jarle. Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a 
Militant Islamist Group. Oxford University Press, 2013; Rob Wise, “Al Shabaab”, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies; Agbiboa, Daniel. "Terrorism without Borders: Somalia’s Al-Shabaab and the global jihad 
network." Journal of Terrorism Research 5, no. 1 (2014); Møller, Bjørn. "Somalia: From Stateless Order to 
Talibanisation?." Elcano Newsletter 54 (2009) and Ayoob, Mohammed, and Hasan Kosebalaban, eds. Religion 
and politics in Saudi Arabia: Wahhabism and the state. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009. 
5 Abdisaib M Ali, “The Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidiin – A profile of the first Somali terrorist organisation”, 
Institute of Political Strategy, Wirtschaftsberatung, Berlin   
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since issued threats against AMISOM-contributing countries and the US.6 While Al Shabaab’s 
claims of bringing the war to Kenya, Uganda and even the US may contribute to an image of 
a transnational Al Shabaab, it is the occurrence of Al Shabaab attacks outside of Somalia which 
definitively make the group a transnational actor, demonstrating the intent, capability and 
opportunity to conduct transnational terror.7 On 9 July 2010, Al Shabaab militants carried out 
twin bombings targeting public viewing sights for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in Kampala, 
Uganda; at least 74 people were killed in the attacks.8 Since then, a number of cross-border 
assaults have taken place in Kenya’s Garissa, Mandera and Wajir counties, and the group has 
orchestrated more organised attacks in larger urban centres, including Nairobi, Mombasa and 
Djibouti City. Among these attacks were the September 2013 siege of the Westgate shopping 
complex in Nairobi, in which 67 people were killed, and the April 2015 attack on Garissa 
University College in northern Kenya, where 148 students died. Given that terrorist attacks are 
driven by intent, capacity and opportunity, and that a terrorist operates within a triangular 
dynamic between the non-state organisation, the victim of an attack and the intended audience 
or target for that attack, what are the explanations for the drivers of Al Shabaab’s use of 
transnational terror?  
 
1.2 Literature survey  
Although conceptualisations of terrorism are manifold9, there is consensus among multiple 
authors, including Walters, Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida as well as Ross, among others, 
that terrorism can be defined as a method of violence in which relatively small amounts of 
severe violence are able to generate significant shock and fear, which ultimately have an impact 
                                                 
6 Henry Gombya and Colins Wanzala, “Al Shabaab declares war on Kenya and calls in suicide bombers”, 
London Evening Post, 28 October 2011; http://www.thelondoneveningpost.com/al-shabaab-declares-war-on-
kenya-and-calls-in-suicide-bombers/  
7 Examples of these references can be found at: “Al-Shabaab statement on deadly campus assault in Kenya”, 
Washington Post, 4 April 2015, accessed April 2015,  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/al-shabab-
statement-on-deadly-campus-assault-in-kenya/2015/04/04/4577ce52-dad9-11e4-8103-fa84725dbf9d_story.html; 
Olivia Becker, “Al Shabaab Promises 'Gruesome War' in Kenya After Massacre at University”, Vice News, 4 
April 2015, accessed April 2015 https://news.vice.com/article/al-shabaab-promises-gruesome-war-in-kenya-
after-massacre-at-university; “Al Shabab Vows to Wage War on Civilians: Report”, CNBS News, 4 April 2015, 
accessed April 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/al-shabab-vows-more-attacks-turning-kenya-red-
blood-report-n335601; Ndegwa Maina, “Al Shabaab Vows To Bring War on Kenyan Soil’, NairobiWire, 23 
May 2014, accessed May 2014, http://nairobiwire.com/2014/05/al-shabaab-vows-bring-war-kenyan-soil.html  
8 For a description of the attacks, see Al Jazeera report “Al-Shabaab claims Uganda bombings”, viewable at 
www.aljazeera.com/new/africa/2010/07/  
9 For studies into the debate regarding the conceptualisation of terrorism, see Tilly, Charles. "Terror, terrorism, 
terrorists." Sociological Theory 22, no. 1 (2004): 5-13.; Findley, Michael G., and Joseph K. Young. "Terrorism 
and civil war: A spatial and temporal approach to a conceptual problem." Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 02 
(2012): 285-305; Crenshaw, Martha, ed. Terrorism in context. Penn State Press, 2010 and Hoffman, Bruce. 
"Defining Terrorism." Social Science Record 24, no. 1 (1986): 6-7; among others.  
8 
 
on a much wider area and scale than the initial attacks.10 The same is true for transnational 
terrorism. In their investigation into the interrelationship between domestic and transnational 
terrorism, Cameron Napps and Walter Enders11 find that, while complex, it is apparent that 
domestic terrorism can lead to transnational terrorism. A low frequency of attacks outside of a 
terrorist organisation’s primary area of operation is able to significantly, and perhaps 
disproportionally, convey the notion that the violence is uncontained and unpredictable. Terror 
actors often change their behaviour, as well as the nature and location of attacks, in order to 
maintain this unpredictability and the associated fear it produces. Al Shabaab has demonstrated 
such adaptability since its inception, transcending from an urban-based Islamist militia to a 
transnational terrorist organisation.12 In Somalia, Islamist militias capitalise on militias which 
emerged in an ensuing security vacuum, basing their support on religion.13 A transnational 
terrorist organisation carries out attacks involving victims, targets, governments, institutions, 
or citizens of another country or within another country.14 Yet, what are the drivers of this 
adoption of transnational terror?  
 
Rational choice theorists see such groups as choosing to engage in terrorist activities following 
the outcome of a rational cost/benefit analysis, in which conducting a terrorist attack is 
considered to be the best available option in the actor’s endeavour to achieve a particular goal.15 
By corollary, the use of transnational terror should follow a choice; the group chooses to engage 
in transnational terror to achieve a particular goal. Terrorism works within a dynamic 
encompassing the intent of the actor, the actor’s capabilities, and opportunities presented by 
the surrounding context.16 The intent of a group is almost exclusively an internal dynamic, 
                                                 
10 See: Walter, Eugene V. "Violence and the Process of Terror." American Sociological Review (1964): 248-
257; Midlarsky, Manus I., Martha Crenshaw, and Fumihiko Yoshida. "Why violence spreads: The contagion of 
international terrorism." International Studies Quarterly (1980): 262-298; Ross, Jeffrey Ian. "Structural causes 
of oppositional political terrorism: Towards a causal model." Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 3 (1993): 317-
329 and Hutchinson, Martha Crenshaw. "The concept of revolutionary terrorism." Journal of Conflict 
Resolution (1972): 383-396; among others.  
11 Napps and Enders, “A regional investigation into the interrelationship of domestic and transnational 
terrorism,” 3.  
12 David M. Anderson and Jacob McKnight, “Understanding Al Shabaab: clan, Islam and insurgency in Kenya”, 
Journal of Eastern African Studies, 9: 537. 
13 Anthony Vinci, “An analysis and comparison of armed groups in Somalia." African Security Studies 15, no. 1 
(2006): 81 
14 Walter Enders, Todd Sandler and Khusrav Gaibulloev, “Domestic versus transnational terrorism: data, 
decomposition, and dynamics”, Journal of Peace Research, 48(3), 2011: 302. 
15 Ozgir Ozdamar, “The Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidiin – A profile of the first Somali terrorist organisation” 1 (2) 
(2008): 92. 
16 See Crenshaw, Martha. "Theories of terrorism: Instrumental and organizational approaches." The Journal of 
strategic studies 10, no. 4 (1987): 13-31;  Ezell, Barry Charles, Steven P. Bennett, Detlof Von Winterfeldt, John 
Sokolowski, and Andrew J. Collins. "Probabilistic risk analysis and terrorism risk." Risk Analysis 30, no. 4 
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driven by the desires and ultimate goals of the group. The use of terror is a deliberate choice 
by a political actor in order to achieve a particular goal.17 Such a claim reflects the instrumental 
approach; the use of transnational terror is a rational choice to advance the goals underpinning 
the organisation. The choice is a result of an assessment of the available opportunities and 
constraints.  
 
In a contrasting theory, the organisational approach equates a terrorist organisation to all other 
organisations, whether corporate or communal; here, the overarching aim of any organisation 
is its own survival.18 As such, it is not the political objectives of the group as a political actor 
which determine the actions of the group, but rather what the organisation requires to ensure 
its survival. These requirements emanate largely from the external context in which the 
organisation exists. Accordingly, a group’s actions, including engaging in transnational 
terrorism, are not necessarily a direct reflection of the group’s ideology or political objectives, 
but are necessitated by the need to ensure the survival of the group. Transnational terrorism is 
particularly useful in this regard as it serves to bolster a group’s reputation or image, likely 
beyond such a group’s genuine capabilities. Napps and Enders find that, groups with 
overarching domestic objectives may conduct transnational assaults to achieve a specific 
goal.19  Here, within the dynamic of intent, capability and opportunity, a presented opportunity 
to carry out a transnational attack is likely to supersede a domestic-orientated agenda to ensure 
the survival of the group.20  
 
Second image theorists posit that conflict is a product of the domestic composition of nation 
states, and that the spread of conflict, including the methods of violence employed therein, 
originates within the domestic environment of one country.21 Here, a conflict begins in one 
country and develops a cross-border dynamic in which violence spills over into a neighbouring 
state.  Key contributors to the growing literature of the spill-over effects of conflict include 
                                                 
(2010): 575-589 and Salama, Sammy, and Lydia Hansell. "Does intent equal capability? Al-Qaeda and weapons 
of mass destruction." Nonproliferation Review 12, no. 3 (2005): 615-653. 
17 See Hutchinson, Martha Crenshaw. "The concept of revolutionary terrorism." Journal of Conflict 
Resolution (1972): 383-396 and Walter, Eugene V. "Violence and the Process of Terror." American Sociological 
Review (1964): 248-257. 
18 Ozdamar, “Theorising terrorist behaviour” 93. 
19 Napps and Enders, “A regional investigation into the interrelationship of domestic and transnational 
terrorism,” 3.  
20 Cameron Napps and Walter Enders, “A regional investigation of the interrelationship between domestic and 
transnational terrorism: a time series analysis”, Defence and Peace Economics, ahead-of-print, (2014): 7.  
21 See: Waltz, Kenneth N. "Reflections on Theory of International Politics."Neorealism and its Critics (1986) 
for an overview of Image theories.  
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Kristian Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan and Kenneth Schultz. In their work on why civil wars 
spread across borders and lead to international disputes, Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz 
identify that civil wars can create new tensions due to spill-over effects from the conflict; 
factors such as mass refugee movement, cross-border damage and environmental impacts of 
the conflict come to affect the security of the neighbouring state.22 These effects can lead to an 
outbreak of conflict in the neighbouring state. 
 
Despite examining civil wars and regional conflicts, Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz’s work 
on the spill-over effects of violence has relevance when studying transnational terrorism. 
Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz argue that, in contrast to previous literature, today’s conflicts 
are not necessarily fought over traditional issues such as territories or domestic resources; 
rather, the dynamics surrounding civil wars – which are, by definition, domestic – are central 
to subsequent international/regional disputes.23 Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz outline at least 
three means through which the spread of conflict across borders occurs; these include 
intervention, externalisation and spill-over effects.  
 
Broadly speaking, spill-over effects refer to the consequences of a civil conflict. The overall 
premise is that civil conflicts create new tensions as a consequence, within which transnational 
terrorism is a viable method of violence. One of the most prominent of these consequences is 
the mass influx of refugees into a neighbouring territory.24 Here, subsequent conflict is a result 
of the unintended spill over of a civil strife and a neighbour’s efforts to prevent or limit the 
detrimental impact within their own territory.25 A prominent subject within this literature is the 
potential for militarisation among refugee populations.26  
 
However, Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz, as well as a number of other authors concerned 
with spill-over effects, are predominantly focused on the relationship between civil and 
                                                 
22  Kristian Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan and Kenneth Shultz, “Fighting at home, fighting abroad: How civil wars 
lead to international disputes”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, (2008): 2. 
23 Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz, “Fighting at home, fighting abroad”, 2. 
24 Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz, “Fighting at home, fighting abroad”, 9. 
25 Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz, “Fighting at home, fighting abroad”, 19. 
26 See Idean Salehyan and Kristian Gleditsch, “Refugees and the spread of civil war”, International 
Organisations,  60 (2) (2006), accessed 3 September 2014, DOI: S0020818306060103; Grace Atim, “The 
impact of refugees on Conflicts in Africa”, accessed 14 September 2014, DOI: 2279-0837; Migueal Carreras, 
“Civil wars and criminality: The spill over of violence”, International Journal of Criminology and Sociology 
Theory,  5 (2012): 838, accessed 3 September 2014, DOI: 1916-2782;  David 1916-2782,  in International 
Spread of Ethnic Violence, D. Lake and D. Rothchild (eds.), Princeton University Press (Princeton, 1998). 
11 
 
(subsequent) regional conflicts involving inter-governmental disputes. With regard to terrorist 
organisations, Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida27 argue that a pattern of contagion also exists 
within the realm of international (and transnational) terrorism.28 Napps and Ender find that 
Sub-Saharan Africa (which, in their study, includes Somalia) proved to be particularly 
vulnerable to the effects of contagion terrorism due to the presence of a number of weak central 
state authorities and significant population movements through poorly secured and porous 
borders.29 These factors, specifically population movements, are exacerbated during times of 
conflict. As such, the spill over of terror activity from one country to another is what creates 
the transnational actor. It is clear in this instance that the violence began in one country and 
developed cross-border features driven by the consequences of the domestic conflict.  
 
This very broad introduction into some of the current understandings of terrorism and conflict 
reveals at least one major debate within the literature. On the one hand, to engage in terrorist 
activity, and transnational terror, is a choice best suited to the overall objectives of the group, 
identified through a rational assessment of the costs and benefits of engaging in such acts. On 
the other hand, terrorism is largely the unintentional consequence of the environment in which 
an organisation operates, required for the survival of the organisation itself. The same holds 
true for transnational activity as, by corollary, transnational terrorism is also a method of 
violence, which has (in this instance) spread outside of the areas of the terrorist actor’s primary 
operations.  
 
However, in their critical review of the conceptualisation of a civil war, Mark Gersovitz and 
Norma Kriger30 recognised the inherent cross-border dynamics operating within what have 
been classified as ‘civil wars’ prior to these spill-over effects. Gersovitz and Kriger argue that 
certain conflicts, defined as civil conflicts which adopt regional characteristics, were multi-
national to begin with. Here, there is a need to distinguish between civil wars and regional war 
complexes; the latter of which emphasises the interdependence of larger-scale violence which 
exists prior to the outbreak of both domestic conflict and any subsequent regional conflicts.31 
                                                 
27 Manus Midlarsky, Martha Crenshaw and Fumihiko Yoshida, “Why violence spreads: The contagion of 
international terrorism”, International Studies Quarterly (1980): 262-298.   
28 Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida, “Why violence spreads”, 263. 
29 Napps and Enders, “A regional investigation into the interrelationship of domestic and transnational 
terrorism”, 13. 
30 Mark Gersovitz and Norma Kriger, “What is a civil war? A critical review of its definition and (economic) 
consequences”, The World Bank Research Observer, 10 (2013). 
31 Gersovitz and Kriger, “What is a civil war?” 16.  
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Gersovitz and Kriger identify the Horn of Africa (encompassing Somalia as well as Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan) as one of the main regional security complexes on the 
African continent.32 The inherent interconnectivity between these states facilitates not only the 
spread of conflict, but transnational terror as a method of violence within such conflict. The 
spread of transnational terrorism, from this perspective, is not due to the objectives of the actor, 
nor is it a product of shocks within the actor’s domestic environment, but stems from these 
wider and entrenched regional dynamics which exist prior to the conflict at hand. Gersovitz 
and Kriger examine the intervention of a foreign actor as a key aspect in the spread of violence; 
this intervention is often motivated by prior regional dynamics.  
 
1.2.1 Concluding review 
From this overview, three distinct positions regarding the drivers of transnational terror are 
evident. Specifically, an actor’s use of transnational activity can be explained as a product of 
choice through an actor-centric assessment of opportunities and constraints present in available 
avenues for the achievement of a particular objective. The use of transnational terror can also 
be explained as a product of the domestic environment, facilitated by refugee movements into 
neighbouring states. Finally, transnational activity can be driven by underlying 
interconnectivity between the states, beyond an actor’s intention to conduct transnational 
attacks or developments contained within the actor’s domestic environment which prompts the 
spread of violence.  These three positions establish the format of this dissertation.  The drivers 
of Al Shabaab’s use of transnational terror can thus be conceptualised as a product of choice 
or a product of developments within Somalia which have ultimately led to the spill over of the 
conflict to surrounding states. Thirdly, Al Shabaab’s use of transnational terror is driven by the 
regional war complex in the Horn of Africa.  
 
1.3 The evaluation  
This dissertation will evaluate each theory so as to ascertain which one offers the strongest 
explanation of the drivers of transnational terror. There are many criteria available through 
which to evaluate a theory. Cramer, for example, presents six criteria of a viable theory; these 
include, comprehensiveness, precision and testability, parsimony, empirical validity, heuristic 
value and applied value.33 However, in his criticism of John Vasquez, Waltz states that a theory 
                                                 
32 Gersovitz and Kriger, “What is a civil war?”19.  
33 Kenneth M Cramer, "Six criteria of a viable theory: Putting reversal theory to the test." Journal of Motivation, 
Emotion, and Personality 1, no. 1 (2013): 9-16. 
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depicts the essential elements, coupled with the requisite interdependent relations of a 
phenomenon.34As such, the critical aspect of a theory is its assumptions which need to hold 
true, consistently, for the theory to meet the requirements of its purpose. Furthermore, Waltz 
states that it is within reality that we observe the phenomenon which a theory attempts to 
explain and as such it is observations within reality which will support a theory.35 This reality-
based support speaks to the empirical evidence of assumptions holding true. According to 
Waltz, a theory should not be a direct reflection of observable reality but serve to explain what 
is observed and hence, should bring clarity to what is observed.36 In this regard, the law of 
parsimony states that a theory should provide the most viable and simple explanation of a case. 
Waltz provides a suitable framework for evaluating theory. If a theory’s assumptions hold true 
for the case at hand, demonstrated through the observable empirical evidence and provides a 
suitable and concise explanation of the case, the theory presents a strong explanation of the 
case. In summary, the evaluation criteria for the aforementioned theories will be:  
 
1. Key assumptions are maintained  
2. The theory offers a parsimonious account of the case  
3. The theory can be supported by at least three pieces of empirical evidence.  
 
1.4 Chapter outline  
A brief requisite context of Somalia is provided in Chapter 2, capturing significant 
developments following the fall of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991. The rise of Al Shabaab is 
outlined from its infancy as the militant wing of the Union of Islamic Courts, to its independent 
operations and current regional activity. This chapter aims to provide the required content for 
tracing the process in the subsequent chapters, including domestic, regional and international 
developments. The first of the three theories to be tested is explored in Chapter 3. A brief 
introduction of Rational Choice Theory is included before the main assumptions of the theory 
are laid out. Al Shabaab’s activities are then mapped out along this scenario, through a 
discussion of expectations and the reality revealed. This process is repeated in chapters 4 and 
5, which deal with Spill-over and the Regional War Complex theories, respectively.  Chapter 
6 provides an evaluation of the three theories and highlights the limitations of the study with 
regards to conceptualising Al Shabaab as a transnational actor. In this concluding chapter, a 
                                                 
34 Kenneth N Waltz. "Evaluating theories." American Political Science Review91, no. 04 (1997): 913 
35 Waltz. "Evaluating theories." : 913 
36 Waltz. "Evaluating theories." : 914 
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brief outlook is addressed regarding the consequences for conceptualising Al Shabaab as a 































Chapter 2: Context  
2.1 Introduction  
In order to assess the drivers of Al Shabaab’s transnational activity, it is necessary to have an 
understanding of the development of the group, the domestic context in which it operates and 
the wider regional dynamics that likely impact the group’s agenda, intent, capabilities and 
opportunities to conduct transnational terror. This chapter will provide a snapshot of the 
relevant histories of Al Shabaab, Somalia and the Horn of Africa, in order to better inform the 
subsequent chapters.  
 
2.2 A national context  
2.2.1 The fall of Siad Barre  
Somalia has been largely considered a failed state since the fall of Mohamed Siad Barre’s 
regime in 1991. Barre had seized power in a bloodless coup in October 1969. From its 
inception, the Barre regime sought to suppress dissidence within Somali society while 
purportedly favouring the elite within Barre’s own clan; his government came to be referred to 
as the M.O.D. regime, an acronym for the preference of the Marehan, Ogaden and 
Dhulbahante37 clans under his regime.38 By 1978, military leaders from the Majeerteen sub-
clan launch a coup against Barre. Although unsuccessful, the coup attempt sparked a wider 
rebellion against the Somali government, and in 1979 Isaaq39 diaspora based in Ethiopia 
formed the Somali National Movement (SNM) which sought to overthrow Barre. The SNM 
was able to muster a low-level insurgency against the government.  
 
Prior to this, the Islamist group, Al Itihaad Al Islamiya40 (AIAI), was formed in 1983 as a 
nationalist movement in opposition to the regime of Mohamed Said Barre.41 The group was 
funded by Salafi ideologists in the wider Gulf region and its top commanders had been foreign 
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fighters in the conflict in Afghanistan (1979-1989).42 In AIAI’s fight against rival armed clan-
based factions operating in Somalia, it characterised itself as an avant-garde group seeking to 
transcend the clan-based divisions and develop a national Somali identity.  
 
By 1987, a segment of the Ogaden clan broke from the government to launch its own opposition 
group, known as the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and elders of the Hawiye clan formed 
the Somali National Alliance (SNA). In addition, Somali exiles from the Hawiye clan in Rome 
formed the United Somali Congress (USC) in 1989.43 The insurgences prompted an 
increasingly violent response from the Somali government, targeting Hawiye and Isaaq civilian 
populations. By December 1990, the USC launched an assault on Mogadishu and was able to 
overrun Barre’s regime, seizing control of the city on 27 January 1991.44 Coinciding with 
Barre’s overthrow, the SNM seized control of territory in the north west of the country, 
declaring the region the independent Republic of Somaliland. 
 
Despite USC leader, Mohamed Farrah Aidid becoming interim leader, the separate opposition 
movements which had collectively sought to overthrow Barre were unable to transform their 
unified opposition against Barre into the reconstruction of the Somali state; soon, infighting 
brought chaos and anarchy to much of the country.45 For the next two years, rival factions 
fought for control of Mogadishu.46 The city was soon divided between competing warlords, 
including the notorious General Hussein Aidid47 and Ali Mohamed Mahdi. Although the 
United Nations (UN) sent troops into the country in 1992 in an effort to quell the violence and 
restore governance in Somalia, it was to no avail.  
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Between 1991 and 1992 the country was engaged in a civil war which, together with a famine, 
displaced millions of people into neighbouring countries.48 The majority of refugees were 
received by Kenya. The civil war promoted a series of international interventions, namely the 
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the US-led Operation Restore Hope. 
Although UNOSOM II was launched in 1993, the worsening conflict with General Mohamed 
Farah Aidid resulted in the withdrawal of UN troops in the country (see section 2.4.2). 
 
The two year civil war allowed for the spread of clan-based competition for both power and 
autonomy.49 This was able to intensify in the absence of a central government. However, these 
warring parties were not unified and susceptible to factionalisation; this resulted in a devolution 
of warfare.50 The civil war, through the proliferation of arms, also contributed greatly to the 
militarisation of society. In the absence of the central state, these faction militias became the 
providers of both security and political representation for Somali clans, but it was the 
emergence of AIAI that managed to transcend clan-dynamics and make use of a cross-cutting 
unifier of religion to garner support.  
 
2.2.2 The rise of the Islamic courts  
Despite AIAI’s efforts, clan allegiances remained inherently strong within the organisation; 
these divisions, together with growing ideological differences, resulted in the splitting of the 
group in 1995.51 The group divided into three units, one of which crossed the border into 
Ethiopia, beginning a campaign against the Ethiopian government through a positive 
relationship with the Ethiopian separatist group, the Ogaden National Liberation Front 
(ONLF).52 Of the two groups which remained in Somalia, the Al Itihaad, predominantly 
comprising members from the Darod53 clan, established a base in the Gedo region. The group 
soon seized control of much of the region and set up an administrative pseudo-state. Al Itihaad 
remained focused on holding territory and worked to recruit members from small and rural 
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communities, specifically targeting devout Muslim communities. However, the group was 
unable to hold on to a significant amount of territory in the region following the Ethiopian 
intervention in Somalia in 1996.54 
 
Soon Islamic courts were set up in constituencies under the influence of Al Itihaad and other 
cadres, as a means to offer governance and laws in the absence of the state. This system of 
governance was a well-received alternative to the inherently corrupt and often violent system 
of warlordism which had formed in the absence of state governance. Some commentators argue 
that the popular acceptance of the courts was founded in the fact that Sharia law offered one of 
the few remaining belief systems yet to be discredited within Somalia’s political crisis.55   
 
The final group to have emerged from AIAI, Al I’tisan Kitab wal Sunnah56 (Al I’tisan), was 
headed by Sheikh Hasan Daahir Aweys and comprised mainly Hawiye clan members, moving 
into Mogadishu and other southern cities. The group attempted to establish an Islamic court in 
Mogadishu. However, these attempts failed largely due to the division between northern 
Mogadishu, under the influence of Ali Mahdi Mohamed of the Muduulood clan, and the 
southern area under General Aidid of the Habar Gidir clan. The first fully functional court was 
set up by a sub-clan of the Hawiye, the Abgal, around 1997.57 Overall, there were four primary 
Islamic courts which emerged: Hararyaale (Murosade), Shirkole (Saleebaan), Ifka Halane 
(‘Ayr) and Warshahada ‘Aanaha (Duduble).58  
 
Despite a number of peace agreements between 1991 and 2000, these did little to address 
insecurity in the country. In 2000 the Somalia National Peace Conference was held in 
Djibouti.59 The conference produced the Transitional National Government (TNG), which 
sought to establish a power-sharing agreement between the warring Somali clans. At the same 
time, the Islamic courts had united to form the UIC. Following this arrangement, the Islamic 
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courts began to maintain a precarious relationship between adhering to the clan system of 
governance and establishing Islamic law. 
 
The TNG’s influence was short lived and the administration was rapidly weakened by growing 
clan-based factionalism and infighting. In addition, the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation 
Council (SRRC) emerged as a key challenger to the TNG, with alleged support from the 
Ethiopian government.  The TNG was viewed as having failed in its mission to establish peace 
between the rival clans, and a new reconciliation process was launched by the regional body, 
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in October 2002. Held in Nairobi, 
Kenya, the IGAD-brokered initiative established a new administration, the TFG, in April 2004. 
Although recognised as the sovereign authority of Somalia, the TFG wielded little control in 
the country, and governed from Kenya between 2004 and 2005 before it was able to relocate 
to Baidoa, convening for the first time in Somalia in 2006.60 However, the transitional body 
was inherently weak and provided little alternative to the previous warlord system.  
 
Amid this governance vacuum, the UIC moved to reassert its influence in Mogadishu, despite 
the development of the TFG.61 The UIC received new support from the Hawiye clan, 
specifically from members of the Habar Gidir62 sub-clan, who felt alienated under the new 
TFG. President of the TNG, Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, belonged to the Habar Gidir sub-clan. 
His successor, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, was of the Majeerteen clan.63 Now, headed by the 
more militant Daahir Aweys, a former member of Al I’tisan, the UIC sought to create an armed 
wing within the group that would not be plagued by clan allegiances which had previously 
weakened the UIC.64 The body was called Mu’askar Mahkamad, and was later renamed 
Jamaa’a Al Shabaab (Al Shabaab).65 Aden Hashi ‘Ayro was appointed commander of the wing. 
Much of the wing’s leadership consisted of former Al I’tisan members who were largely 
sympathetic to global jihad ideologies.66 Many of the leaders, including ‘Ayro, also spent time 
in Afghanistan during the Soviet conflict as part of the AIAI, where they adopted an 
increasingly anti-US stance. This stance was fostered by similar sentiments towards US 
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political involvement in the Horn of Africa (see section 2.4.4).67 Among these leaders were 
Mukhtar Robow (also known as Abu Mansoor, from the Leysan/Rahanweyn clan), Ahed Aw 
Abdi Godane (of the Ishaaq/Dir clan), Ibraahim Al Afghani (also Ishaaq) and Abu Qutaybah 
(from the Hawiye clan).68  
 
Following the failure of the TNG, and with the TFG’s authority extending little beyond Baidoa, 
the UIC continued to fill the authority and security vacuum in several strategic areas in the 
country, including sectors of Mogadishu. By late 2005, there were at least 11 clan-based courts 
established in Mogadishu alone, offering a stark rivalry for secular warlords who also 
controlled parts of the city.69 Towards the end of the same year, these warlords formed the 
Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT). With the support of 
local Somali businessmen, the UIC captured control of Mogadishu from the ARPCT in June 
2006.70 Although sporadic fighting continued in the city for several weeks, the ARPCT was 
defeated by July.71  
 
Al Shabaab made significant gains during the fight against the ARPCT. The group had 
established a means of securing independent military supplies, and garnered local support 
networks which were increasingly loyal to it, outside of UIC support.72 The main Mogadishu 
airport and seaport were reopened, government buildings were vacated, illegal land grabs were 
stopped and special courts were established to handle claims of restitution.73 In addition, Al 
Shabaab’s leaders were appointed to the UIC’s Executive Council and the group gained 
standing within the UIC.  
 
With the warlords pushed from Mogadishu, tensions between the UIC and the TFG worsened. 
The UIC’s increasing influence and power in Mogadishu not only threatened the TFG in 
Baidoa, but unsettled its primary state backer, Ethiopia.74 Despite an initial round of talks 
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between the two parties in June 2006, the TFG backed out of the second round scheduled for 
July due to asserted increased hostility by the UIC;75 UIC rhetoric towards the TFG became 
increasingly critical and aggressive. The UIC adopted a stronger nationalist identity through its 
criticism and condemnation of the involvement of Ethiopia in Somalia’s affairs, specifically as 
a backer of the TFG and the presence of Ethiopian troops in the country.  
 
From Ethiopia’s perspective, this resurgence of the UIC, specifically the role that former Al 
Itihaad member, Hasan Daahir Aweys76, assumed in the UIC as leader of Al Shabaab, 
amounted to a reconstituted Al Itihaad controlling Mogadishu. For Ethiopia, such a 
development was a likely threat, as the group had past relations with ethnic insurgent groups 
such as the ONLF, and encouraged the radicalisation of Ethiopia’s sizeable Muslim 
populations.77 In December 2006, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1725 authorised 
the deployment of an AU peacekeeping mission in an effort to establish credible dialogue 
between the TFG and UIC.78 The UIC had always been critical of the presence of foreign troops 
in Somalia, specifically Ethiopian troops, and the resolution was viewed as an attack on the 
UIC (see Section 2.3).79 
 
Yet, as much as the UIC sought to bring a national identity to Mogadishu, cracks were forming 
in the group’s efforts to unite the continuum of political Islam, which ranged from moderate to 
extreme. Ideological friction worsened between the moderates, predominantly led by Sheik 
Sharif, and the radical wing led by Aweys; this friction was further bolstered by the prominent 
role of Al Shabaab, which was agitating for a more extreme interpretation of Islam. Different 
spokespersons of the UIC issued varying and contradictory responses to the TFG; however, 
Sheik Sharif stated that the UIC would not attack the TFG. Indicative of this, on 12 December 
2006, Sheikh Yusuf Mohammed Siad (Sheik Indha’adde80), then-chief of the military arm, 
together with Sheikh Mukhtar Robow issued a seven-day ultimatum to Ethiopia and the TFG 
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to remove foreign troops from Somalia or face attack.81 Indeed, after the expiration of the 
ultimatum, factions in the UIC engaged in combat with the Ethiopian troops and government 
militias in Baidoa. The UIC’s military capacity did not match that of the combined Ethiopian 
and government forces, and by 28 December Ethiopian forces and the TFG had recaptured 
Mogadishu.82 
 
Following the defeat of the UIC, prominent clan elders, citizens and Somali diaspora 
participated in a National Reconciliation Conference convened by the TFG in Mogadishu 
between 15 July and 30 August 2007.83 However, remnants of the now-defeated UIC held a 
separate meeting in Asmara, the capital of Eritrea – a purported backer of the UIC. These forces 
joined under a new banner, the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), which was a 
political body aimed at challenging the TFG. However, Al Shabaab separated itself from the 
initiative. The autonomy and independent support networks which Al Shabaab had garnered 
during its successes for the UIC served the group well in establishing independent operations 
in Somalia. Although the group had dispersed following the Ethiopian intervention, key 
leaders, including ’Ayro and Aweys, conveyed a unified and consistent ideology and objective 
in periodically released audio recordings.84 The group had adopted a nationalist standpoint, 
stating that the people of Somalia had a right to defend their country; this rhetoric was able to 
yield a degree of popular support given the ongoing presence of Ethiopian troops in the 
country.85 
 
In the absence of the provision of state security, the UIC was largely welcomed, with the quasi-
state structures provided through the group’s Islamic approach.  The sharia courts were able to 
provide parallel state structures which stemmed from the Mosque, which included security 
provision and protection.86 Furthermore, the UIC was able to capitalise on non-clan alliances. 
The UIC’s success in Somalia was aided by the fact that the Somali governing body, in the 
form of TFG, had been located outside of the country, in Nairobi. This, coupled with AIAI 
splinter group, ONLF and subsequent Ethiopian hesitation towards a resurgence in the UIC 
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and role that former Al Itihaad member, Hasan Daahir Aweys amounted to the reconstituted 
Al Itihaad controlling Mogadishu. Yet the UIC was not without its own regional partnerships, 
given the alleged support from Asmara. It is event in this period that foreign interventions had 
given rise to a greater nationalist agenda from within the UIC’s sub-units.  
 
2.2.3 The rise of Al Shabaab  
Following the defeat of the UIC by government and Ethiopian forces in 2006, Al Shabaab split 
from the UIC to form an independent insurgent group which continued to fight against the 
government, regional forces as well as other armed groups in Somalia. The split was largely 
attributed to growing ambitions within Al Shabaab’s leadership, as well as resentment over the 
losses the group had accrued, relative to other UIC units, during the UIC defeat in 2006.87 Al 
Shabaab was able to garner significant popular support. The invasion of Ethiopia, a state which 
had a protracted history of strained relations with Somalis, fuelled local resentment against 
‘foreigners’, bolstering Al Shabaab’s support base.88 In addition, Al Shabaab’s increasingly 
anti-TFG stance, juxtaposed to UIC willingness to enter talks, prompted significant backing 
from the Hawiye clan, which saw the Ethiopia-backed TFG as favouring the Majeerteen-
Rahawin alliance.89 
 
In 2006 and 2007, Al Shabaab largely withdrew from conventional warfare, regrouping in the 
south of Somalia. Through an insurgent campaign comprising hit-and-run attacks, improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), bombings and assassinations in the south, Al Shabaab stymied the 
southward advance of Ethiopian forces.90 Although Al Shabaab appeared to be a marginal 
insurgent group and not a direct threat to the control of Mogadishu during this time, it displayed 
a unique modus operandi, by carrying out two suicide bombings in Baidoa. By August 2007, 
the frequency of Al Shabaab attacks increased significantly, and the group was thought to be 
responsible for up to 60 percent of all attacks in Mogadishu.91 In November 2007, the group 
was responsible for 55 percent of all attacks against TFG interests. 
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Simultaneously, the group was able to take advantage of a more international profile; the 
leaders’ AIAI history served them in gaining support from Al Qaeda (see Section 2.4.4). Al 
Qaeda had declared support for the group as early as July 2006.92 The group also sought to 
develop an online profile in late 2007, with the establishment of the Hegan and Kataaibi 
websites.  
 
Between 2008 and 2009 Al Shabaab secured Baidoa, Mogadishu and Kismayo, and worked to 
establish sophisticated funding and recruitment networks. Not only was Al Shabaab able to pay 
recruits, often per attack, due to revenue generated through illegal taxation networks and the 
illicit trade of charcoal from the port of Kismayo; it was able to use the coinciding development 
of Islamic solidarity to garner support, including among the Somali diaspora.93 The group also 
established an intricate intelligence unit, the Aminyat94, which facilitated in the accurate 
capture of intelligence in order to plan more sophisticated attacks.95 
 
In response to the rise of Al Shabaab in the country, as well as the continued insecurity in 
Somalia, the African Union (AU) deployed a counterinsurgency operation, AMISOM, aimed 
at eradicating the group. Troops from Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda were deployed to 
Somalia in March 2007.96 In late 2008, the TFG had struck a deal with former UIC members, 
including future president Sheikh Sharif Ahmed. The deal helped the TFG to gain greater 
legitimacy, particularly among former UIC-supporting communities outside Mogadishu.97 
However, the TFG’s authority still failed to extend beyond Mogadishu. The TFG’s inability to 
provide security and state authority was furthered by Ethiopia’s withdrawal in 2009. 
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The AMISOM operation was soon bolstered by the launch of the independently mandated 
‘Operation Linda Nchi’ by the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) in October 2011.98 These 
operations had significant successes against Al Shabaab, recapturing Mogadishu in 2011, 
Kismayo in 2012 and Barawa in 2014, and forcing the group further south. Al Shabaab moved 
to consolidate its presence in the Lower Shabelle, Bakool and Hiraan regions; however, despite 
losing the territories, Al Shabaab has maintained a network of operatives in both Mogadishu 
and Kismayo.99 
 
International intervention in Somalia inadvertently assisting in bridging the gap between Islam 
and clan allegiances as a unifying feature of Al Shabaab, as illustrated by Ethiopia’s invasion 
and backing of  the TFG, which was seen by the Hawiye clan has showing a preference towards 
the rival Majeerteen-Rahawin alliance. Furthermore, Al Shabaab was able to capitalise on its 
relationship with its international ally, Al Qaeda.  
  
2.2.4 Al Shabaab today  
Since its independence from the UIC, the group has aimed to overthrow the current Somali 
administration. This objective stems from strong opposition to the administration’s cooperation 
with Western governments and the asserted interference of neighbouring countries, specifically 
the presence of foreign troops in Somalia.100  Throughout its insurgency in Somalia, Al 
Shabaab has maintained both a nationalist and Islamist ideology through its aims to overthrow 
the Ethiopia-backed TFG, replacing this with Sharia-based governance.101 However, the 
aligning of interests with Al Qaeda since 2006, and more formally since 2012,102 has served to 
bolster the group’s wider objectives. The group’s ideological rhetoric has portrayed the conflict 
in Somalia as a front in a global war against the West. Between 2008 and 2014, the lack of 
governance in southern Somalia continued to provide Al Shabaab with a safe haven. Although 
the group appears to be locked in a domestic conflict with AMISOM and FGS security forces 
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in Somalia, by having carried out terrorist attacks in Uganda, Kenya and Djibouti, Al Shabaab 
also became an Al Qaeda-aligned terrorist group.103 
 
The consolidation of this second identity coincided with a leadership crisis between 2011 and 
2013. The late Ahmed Aw Abdi Godane, who had assumed leadership of Al Shabaab in 2008, 
had largely rejected Al Shabaab’s nationalist goals, and is seen as the driver behind Al 
Shabaab’s more formal allegiance with Al Qaeda.104 Audio recordings released by Godane 
indicate a more global rhetoric, with an increased anti-US agenda, in line with then-Al Qaeda 
leader, Osama Bin Laden.105 Nevertheless, Godane continued to reject the TFG, and later the 
FGS. Under Godane, Al Shabaab conducted two high-profile terrorist attacks, namely the 2010 
Kampala bombings and the 2013 Westgate shopping mall siege in Nairobi. 
 
Apart from directing Al Shabaab on a more global jihadist path, and orchestrating terrorist 
attacks outside of Somalia, Godane sought to centralise the group’s leadership structure. 
Relations between the more pro-nationalist Sheikh Mukhtar Robow and Godane had soured 
from 2008. This dispute escalated in October 2010, when after a failed Ramadan offensive in 
Mogadishu, Robow withdrew his troops from the city, threatening to form a new faction.106 
Again, in July 2011, a dispute resulted in the withdrawal of troops from Baidoa. Sheikh Hassan 
Dahir Aweys, leader of the Hizbul Islam affiliate, was also at loggerheads with Godane over 
Al Shabaab attacks against Hizbul Islam-held territory. Under mounting pressure from 
AMISOM and TFG troops in Mogadishu, Al Shabaab was forced to withdraw its forces from 
Mogadishu in August 2011.107 Robow heavily criticised Godane for the loss of the capital, 
against which Al Shabaab had launched an assault a year prior. A number of additional Al 
Shabaab leaders also denounced Godane’s rule between 2012 and 2013. By mid-2013, 
however, divisions in the group’s leadership had worsened and some leaders began agitating 
for Godane’s removal.108 In June 2013, Godane loyalists moved against dissidents; Ibrahim Al 
Afghani and Ma’alim Burhan were assassinated in Barawa. Following the killing of Godane’s 
adversaries in 2013, both Robow and Aweys fled to Lower Shabelle, amid reports that both 
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men had defected to the Somali government.109 Godane replaced Robow and Ibrahim Al 
Afghani with close ally, Mahad Warsame Qaley Karate, and suspended the group’s executive 
council.110 This ultimately rid Al Shabaab of Godane’s adversaries and served to rally the group 
under Godane.  
 
Godane was subsequently killed in a US-led drone strike in an Al Shabaab stronghold in 
Somalia’s Lower Shabelle region on 1 September 2014. Al Shabaab confirmed his death in a 
statement on 6 September, naming Sheikh Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaidah as his successor. Ahmad 
Umar is understood to have worked closely with Godane. The group’s decision to reiterate its 
commitment to Al Qaeda during the 6 September 2014 statement likely indicates that its 
immediate orientation under Umar will unlikely shift in ideology or objectives.111 
 
Following Al Shabaab’s leadership change in 2008, the group consolidated a dual agenda 
comprising nationalist goals and participation in the global jihad off the back of a growing 
relationship with Al Qaeda.  
 
2.3 A regional context 
2.3.1 The Ogaden War and Ethiopia’s role in Somalia  
The 1977 Somali invasion of Ethiopia served to cement complex and somewhat hostile 
relations between the two countries, which had been adversaries throughout much of modern 
history. The invasion sparked the Ogaden War, which would come to cement Somalia as an 
aggressor in the region and served to largely legitimise subsequent Ethiopian intervention in 
Somali affairs. While the roots of the conflict can be traced back to the 15th century, prior to 
the 1977 invasion, three past legacies were key drivers of the conflict. These were the borders 
created during European colonial rule, the legacy of Somalian irredentism, and interventions 
by the two super powers in the wider Cold War context.112 
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Both Ethiopia and Somalia have laid claim to the Ogaden region, which extends down from 
Ethiopia’s southern highlands.113 The region had long been occupied by Somali nomads. 
However, under Emperor Menelik II, Ethiopia began to increasingly lay territorial claim to the 
region from the 1890s, and from the 1930s under Emperor Haile Selassie, conflicting claims 
of authority over the territory were further complicated by the transfer of the region between 
Ethiopian- and Italian-administered areas.114 The British reoccupied the territory in 1941 in an 
effort to unify administration in the Horn, excluding French-controlled Djibouti. Yet, cautious 
of an independent Somali state that could include the Ogaden, Selassie again claimed the region 
as part of Ethiopia and officially secured the region in 1948. 115 
 
British-administered Somaliland and Italian Somaliland united to form an independent 
Republic of Somalia on 1 July 1960. Since gaining independence, Somalia had adopted a 
foreign policy aimed at reuniting territory and populations believed to be under foreign control, 
namely the Ogaden region in Ethiopia, Djibouti, and the Northern Frontier District extending 
into Kenya.116 Somalia refused to recognise any pre-independence treaties defining the 
Somalia-Ethiopia border and a number of skirmishes were reported along the ill-defined border 
in late 1960. Post-independent Somalia came to prioritise the reunification of all areas 
populated by Somalis.117 Efforts by the Ethiopian imperial regime prior to the end of the Derg 
regime in 1974 prioritised increasing the influence of pro-Ethiopian groups and individuals in 
Mogadishu in order to contain Somali irredentism.118 Yet the resultant power vacuum in 
Ethiopia following the overthrow of the Derg regime offered an opportunity to intensify the 
irredentism agenda under Siad Barre and challenge Ethiopia’s dominance in the Horn of Africa. 
The Somali government lent its support to the pro-Somali Western Somali Liberation Front 
(WSLF) in the Ogaden region.119 Despite initial successes, capturing 60 percent of the Ogaden 
territory between 1977 and 1978, the Somali armed forces were defeated and a truce was 
declared in March 1978. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the war, both the Mogadishu and 
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Addis Ababa administrations would go on to support their rival’s adversaries until the 
overthrow of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991. 
 
In the post-Barre era, Ethiopia remained attuned with developments in Somalia and became 
increasingly wary of the rise of the Islamic Courts, given its links to Al Itihaad and associated 
risks to security in Ethiopia. Ethiopia engaged in sporadic attacks within Somali territory. By 
1999, faction leaders, including Ali Mahdi and Hussein Aidid, issued a joint statement to the 
UN Security Council and the then-Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to intervene in 
response to continued reports of cross-border attacks by Ethiopian troops.120 Ethiopia swung 
its support behind the TFG, headed by known Ethiopia ally, Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed.121 As the 
TFG’s limited authority became increasingly challenged domestically, the Ethiopian 
parliament passed a resolution in November 2006 which allowed the government to take all 
necessary steps to ward off attacks by the Islamic Council in Somalia, allowing for an invasion 
by Ethiopian troops.122While tensions between Ethiopia, Somalia and groups within the 
Ogaden region contributed substantially to regional power dynamics in the Horn of Africa, the 
coinciding creation of the ‘Global War on Terror’ presented Ethiopia with a renewed 
opportunity to cement its dominance against Somalia.123 
 
Ultimately, the Ogaden war had legitimised Ethiopia’s subsequent interventionary action 
against its perceived aggressor. However, these regional dynamics also developed in a 
corresponding dynamic regarding the relationship between former Al Itihaad member, Hasan 
Daahir Aweys, the UIC and Al Shabaab.  
 
2.3.2 Kenya’s intervention in Somalia 
The launch of Operation Linda Nchi in October 2011 marked Kenya’s independent 
involvement in the Somalia conflict. The initial mandate of the operation was to establish a 
security zone in southern Somalia and capture the port city of Kismayo, a strategically valuable 
Al Shabaab stronghold.124 Although often discussed as a near-gut response to a series of cross-
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border attacks and kidnappings by Al Shabaab militants in 2010 within Kenyan territory, 
Kenya had been threatening to enter Somalia as early as 2009, with Kenyan Foreign Minister, 
Moses Masika Wetangula, seeking US support for an invasion plan, although this was rebuffed. 
Nevertheless, the KDF entered Somalia on 16 October 2011. The mission was largely 
motivated by the chronic refugee crisis in Garissa County, which was increasingly perceived 
as a security concern; Ethiopian and Ugandan concerns (following the Kampala bombings) 
were driving regional anxieties over terrorism and security and the associated threat to Kenya’s 
tourism economy, with border insecurity impacting the public perception over the safety of 
popular destinations such as Lamu Island. Although initially constructed as an invasion plan, 
the KDF soon occupied captured territory in Somalia in the absence of Somali state authorities, 
who were thus unable to hand over control. By November 2011, Kenyan President Mwai 
Kibaki, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and FSG President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed 
declared that they would tackle the regional security threat, conceptualised in Al Shabaab, in a 
unified effort. In June 2012, the KDF contingent became a formal part of AMISOM.125  
 
In August 2012, the KDF contingent moved on Kismayo. The strategic port city served as an 
important part of Al Shabaab’s revenue sources; illegal trade and taxation networks for sugar, 
cement and manufactured goods as well as the illicit charcoal trade through the port generating 
a reported USD 25 million in yearly revenue.126 The KDF secured the port in September 2012. 
However, the loss did not spell the demise of Al Shabaab, which had already regrouped in 
Jubaland. Al Shabaab attacks increased in southern Somalia; the group became increasingly 
engaged in guerrilla tactics, as its post-Kismayo dispersion prevented more conventional 
fighting. The loss of the port did not lead to a cessation of Al Shabaab’s revenue, although this 
was reduced. A report by the UN Monitoring Group in Somalia in 2013 indicated that illegal 
trade continued through the port, linked to rent-seeking practices by KDF soldiers.127  
  
Ultimately, however, Operation Linda Nchi cemented Kenya as an independent interventionary 
force in Somalia.  
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2.3.4 Al Shabaab’s transnational activity  
Al Shabaab orchestrated its first transnational terrorist attack outside of Somalia on 11 July 
2010, when 76 people were killed in multiple suicide bombings in Kampala, the capital city 
of Uganda. The group claimed that the attacks were in retaliation for the deployment of 
Ugandan peacekeeping troops in Somalia as part of AMISOM. Although this was the first high-
profile attack, Al Shabaab had previously been linked to attacks in Ethiopia's Ogaden region. 
Between 2010 and 2012, the group also engaged in isolated attacks along the shared border 
with Kenya; specifically in the vicinity of the Dadaab refugee camp. In addition, Al Shabaab 
militants carried out four kidnappings in the Dadaab refugee camp and in Lamu County, in 
Kenya, close to the border with Somalia in 2010.   
 
On 16 October 2011, Kenyan authorities launched the independent intervention in Somalia by 
the KDF, Operation Linda Nchi. The operation flagged Kenya as a direct adversary of the 
group, with Al Shabaab publically threatening to attack Kenyan interests in response. Within 
days of the launch of the operation, grenade and IED blasts were reported in Garissa. A grenade 
attack at a bar in Nairobi came two days after the launch of Operation Linda Nchi.128 From 
October 2011 into 2012, Kenya experienced an uptick in low-level attacks, including grenade 
attacks and IED blasts, as well as attacks on police checkpoints in the border counties of 
Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu. Small-scale bombings and grenade attacks also took place 
in Nairobi and Mombasa, many of which were attributed to Al Shabaab militants and 
(domestic) sympathisers.129 
 
Since the launch of the operation and the game-changing attack against the Westgate Shopping 
Mall in Nairobi’s affluent Westlands suburb in September 2013, which demonstrated the 
group’s intent and operational capacity to conduct sophisticated mass-casualty attacks outside 
of Somalia, attacks continued to be reported in Kenya, specifically in the Wajir, Garissa and 
Lamu counties, as well as in Nairobi and Mombasa. According to the Global Terrorism 
database (GTD), over 200 recorded Al Shabaab incidents were reported in Kenya since the 
launch of Operation Linda Nchi, between October 2011 and 31 December 2014.130 In the most 
recent high-profile attack on 21 April 2015, Al Shabaab militants laid siege to the Garissa 
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University College campus in Garissa town, Garissa County; 147 students were killed and 79 
injured during the assault.131 The siege ended following the deployment of the Kenya Special 
Forces; four of the perpetrators were killed in the ensuing security operation.  
 
Al Shabaab also claimed responsibility for the 24 May 2014 bombing of La Chaumiere 
restaurant in Djibouti City, in which a Turkish national was killed. However, Al Shabaab 
activity in Ethiopia has been less prominent. Although the group claimed responsibility for a 
failed bombing in Addis Ababa in October 2013, the incident proved peculiar.132 Al Shabaab 
claimed responsibility for the failed attack via social media the following day, after Ethiopian 
authorities claimed that the perpetrators, who were killed in the attack, were Somali nationals.  
However, some commentators have purported that the government’s claim of Al Shabaab 
involvement was a ploy to crack down on domestic dissident groups, including the ONLF.133 
Nevertheless, government agencies, including the US Embassy in Addis Ababa, have issued 
several alerts warning of possible Al Shabaab attacks in the country on a number of occasions, 
with Al Shabaab making continuous threats to attack Ethiopian interests in response to the 
Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia. 
 
Although the group has orchestrated high-profile attacks in Kenya, Djibouti and Uganda, the 
majority of attacks have comprised raids on local villages along Kenya’s border with Somalia. 
Between 2012 and 2013, the majority of attacks took place in the former North Eastern 
province, specifically in the northern Mandera County. From 2013, sporadic attacks were 
reported further south in the province as well as in Nairobi, and Coast province. While there 
was a heavy presence of Al Shabaab activity recorded in Nairobi in 2013, this shifted to the 
Coast province between 2014 and 2015.134 These areas recently targeted by Al Shabaab have 
historically consisted of marginalised populations. In addition, recent Al Shabaab attacks 
within Kenya between June 2014 and December 2015 have been characterised by the specific 
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targeting of civilians perceived to be outsiders to the community.135 Reports of the  June 2014 
Mpeketoni attacks, in which 48 people were killed, as well as the December 2014 attack against 
a quarry in Mandera and the April 2015 attack against Garissa University College, all contain 
evidence that militants specifically targeted non-Muslims after attempting to identify and 
distinguish between Muslim and non-Muslim victims.136 It is likely that Al Shabaab has begun 
to capitalise on Kenya’s religious and ethnic divisions in a distinct shift from earlier low-level 
and indiscriminate attacks witnessed between 2012 and 2013. This likely indicates an acute 
awareness of the domestic and local dynamics within Kenya. Furthermore, reports between 
May and July 2015 illustrated that Al Shabaab militants had seized territory in Kenya’s Lamu 
County.137 
  
It is clear that the protracted crisis in Somalia has allowed Al Shabaab to thrive domestically. 
The group was initially able to piggy-back on the legitimacy of the UIC before gaining its own 
nationalist reputation and associated support against Ethiopian intervention and the foreign 
presence in the country. However, it was also able to take advantage of residual public 
sentiments derived from the Ogaden War and problematic relations with Ethiopia. Somalia has 
long been an arena for foreign intervention, from the Cold War dynamics during the Ogaden 
conflict to the role of the US in the post-9/11 era. While this has played into Al Shabaab’s 
nationalist agenda, it has also involved a multitude of players in the latest conflict against the 
group, which lies far beyond Somalia’s borders.  
 
Furthermore, Al Shabaab has faced internal challenges stemming from a competition for 
leadership, which was particularly acute under Godane. This has likely led to more risky 
behaviour, with Godane seeking to consolidate his power through an emboldened Al Shabaab, 
piggy-backing on the global reputation of Al Qaeda. If one assumes that terrorism is a ‘force-
multiplying’ strategy, then an internally divided and relatively weak group, in terms of 
conventional warfare, facing well-equipped enemies in Somalia is likely to adopt terrorist 
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tactics. The ability to conduct transnational attacks will serve to further this effect, particularly 
when attempting to combat intervening foreign forces.  
 
2.4 An international context 
2.4.2 The role of the US  
The Horn of Africa has emerged as a strategic location for global powers since World War II. 
The US in particular had a keen interest in Ethiopia and established the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Agreement (MDAA) with Ethiopia in 1953.138 Yet during the Cold War, Ethiopia 
and Somalia became important pawns in the broader geopolitical conflict, demonstrated by the 
initial Soviet provision of military and technical support to Somalia under Barre, while the US 
bolstered Ethiopia’s military expertise in accordance with the MDAA. However, with Barre 
ending the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, these proxies changed 
sides during the Ogaden conflict.   
 
Although US involvement in the Horn of Africa has been influential since the Cold War proxy 
war dynamics within the Ogaden War, the US relationship with Al Shabaab was ultimately 
driven following the end of the Cold War and the subsequent foreign policy focus on combating 
global jihad. The US established a military base in neighbouring Djibouti as part of its East 
African Counterterrorism Initiative.139 With the coinciding rise of the UIC in Somalia in the 
early 1990s, the US faced a perceived increase in the threat of Islamist radicalism on its African 
frontline and subsequently threw its support behind the ARPCT. As the ARPCT comprised 
former warlords, this move was increasingly detrimental to the US reputation in Somalia.140 
The withdrawal of the US Operation Restore Hope generated further mistrust among the 
Somali population regarding the motives for US involvement in Somalia. The failure of UN-
US humanitarian intervention in the mid-1990s came to influence US foreign policy towards 
the country and the US adopted an increasingly risk-averse approach. Yet the 1998 bombings 
of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam marked a turning point in the US 
conceptualisation of Somalia as an Al Qaeda safe haven, after it was discovered that those 
responsible for the bombings had resided in Somalia. The US stepped up its counterterrorism 
operations in the country and in the renewed ‘war on terror’ era after the 9/11 attacks in the US 
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in 2001, Somalia remained a key battlefield. As part of the US ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ 
in the Horn of Africa, the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa was established at 
Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti in December 2002.141 
 
US and Ethiopian cooperation between 2001 and 2010 bolstered Ethiopian intervention in 
Somalia amid a ‘glocal’ counterterrorism strategy (prioritising global and regional operations), 
which aimed to fight international terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Both regional and global 
actors were engaged in disrupting and dismantling alleged material and political bases linked 
to Al Qaeda, specifically involving Ethiopian troops on the ground and US technologies for 
surveillance and warfare.142 The US linked state failure with the proliferation of terrorism in 
the post-9/11 era and, by corollary, sought state building strategies within its counterterrorism 
objectives in Somalia, throwing its support behind the TFG and subsequent FGS, retaining its 
risk-adverse approach to Somalia. 
 
2.4.3 Other foreign actors  
The UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM 1) was established in April 1992 in response to the 
worsening humanitarian crisis in Somalia. UNOSOM was primarily a humanitarian mission 
but faced increased security challenges. As the situation began to deteriorate, the UN Security 
Council passed Resolution 794, which provided for the creation of the US-led Unified Task 
Force (UNITAF) to assist with the safe delivery of humanitarian aid. UNITAF troops were 
deployed to Mogadishu and later to central Somalia.143 Yet insecurity remained a significant 
concern, prompting the passing of Resolution 873 and the creation of UNOSOM II. Resolution 
873 acted upon Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which provides for the use of force to maintain 
or restore peace and security.144 UNOSOM was in operation in Somalia between March 1993 
and March 1995. UNOSOM II ended following the passing of UN Resolution 954; the mission 
marked the first time that the UN had withdrawn from a country without achieving its mandate. 
However, since May 2013, the UN has maintained the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia 
(UNSOM) in an effort to support the consolidation of the Federal Government of Somalia as 
well as to support AMISOM peacekeeping missions.  
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AMISOM was established in January 2007, replacing the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM), which had failed to get 
off the ground since 2005. Although initially mandated for six months, the operation was 
extended by the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2182 in 2014, until November 2015. 
The mission was mandated to take all necessary action “to carry out support for dialogue and 
reconciliation by assisting with free movement, safe passage and protection of all those 
involved in a national reconciliation congress involving all stakeholders, including political 
leaders, clan leaders, religious leaders and representatives of civil society”.145 
 
The region is of strategic value to global powers, owing largely to its geographical importance 
as the gate to the Gulf of Suez and Suez Canal.  As such, global powers, and specifically the 
US in this regard, have had protracted involvement in the region. Yet, the latest involvement 
comes amid the context of the global ‘war on terror’ and, given the view that an ungoverned 
Somalia provided a safe haven for transnational and international terrorist groups, the global 
war on terror promoted renewed efforts to back a governmental force in the country. In the 
absence of consolidated and able state security provision, these interventionary bodies have 
become part of the latest players competing to provide the functions of the absent state.  
 
2.4.4 The role of international Islamists   
The 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and the subsequent link to Al Qaeda 
logistical bases in Somalia, cemented Somalia as part of the international terror network.146 Al 
Qaeda’s connections with Somalia can be traced back to the relationship with leadership within 
AIAI.  Funded by Salafi ideologists in the wider Gulf region, AIAI’s top commanders had been 
foreign fighters in the conflict in Afghanistan (1979-1989).147 This instilled an inherent anti-
US stance which would come to sit well with Al Qaeda allies, particularly in light of US 
involvement in the Horn of Africa. The relationship between Al Qaeda and AIAI continued 
after the US withdrawal from Somalia in the early 1990s.148 
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Nevertheless, in Al Qaeda’s bid to unify Islamist groups within its global network in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, Al Qaeda drew on Takfiri ideologies149, which provided for the 
targeting of apostate governments as well as stressed the need for both the amalgamation of 
militant groups and the targeting of global enemies, specifically, the US and the West.150 This 
rhetoric provided for the targeting of both local and global enemies and as such, affiliates did 
not have to abandon their domestic agenda.151 Consequently, through their alliance with Al 
Qaeda, Al Shabaab capitalise on an international profile while maintaining their insurgency 
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Chapter 3: Rational Choice Theory  
3.1 Introduction  
According to Rational Choice Theory, which assumes that actors are rational beings, actors 
have preferences based on their estimated objectives, each yielding different outcomes which 
can have greater or lesser benefits for the actor.153 As such, all complex social phenomena, 
including transnational terrorism, can be explained in terms of the individual actions of which 
these phenomena are made.154 In this regard, an actor makes the choice to engage in cross-
border terrorism.  
 
3.2 The theory 
The theory models social interaction on economic action, where actors are motivated by the 
profit offered by a specific action relative to the possible losses accrued. Each actor is self-
motivated.155 Following an assessment of the costs and benefits of these possible outcomes, an 
actor makes a rational decision and will select the path that results in the most beneficial 
outcome with the fewest possible losses.156 For some rational theorists, this is based on the 
premise that rationality is a product of the human psyche, while others purport that it is simply 
necessary to assume rationality when seeking to explain social phenomena. All social 
phenomena or interactions are thus reducible to a rational individual actor’s actions.157 The 
theory also incorporates collective action, by assuming that the actions of groups can be 
equated to the actions of individuals and that they are determined by the same cost/benefit 
assessment. A group is thus understood to act as a single entity.  
 
Rational Choice Theory, when applied to terrorism, characterises terrorists or terrorist 
organisations as rational actors which seek to maximise benefits subject to their capabilities as 
well as to reduce possible losses.158 The same holds true for the choice to engage in 
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transnational terrorism. This is based on the assumption that a terrorist organisation has an 
internalised set of consistent values and beliefs which determine its objectives.159 These values 
and beliefs are stable. The actor must therefore choose between non-terrorist and terrorist 
activities, while being constrained by their respective resources and assessing possible losses 
caused by engaging in terrorist activity and, by corollary, conducting cross-border attacks.160 
Here, the choice to engage in transnational terrorism is conceptualised as a logical means to 
achieve the group’s political objectives.  
 
For Martha Crenshaw, the use of terrorist tactics by a specific actor is based on a rational choice 
to do so.161 Crenshaw purports that violence directed towards the state, in the form of a terrorist 
act, is conducted for the purpose of political change, whereby the act of terrorism is used to 
communicate a political message. The preconditions which lead to a terrorist attack are not the 
short-term precipitants which facilitate the attack itself, such as determining the target selection 
and timing of a single attack, but rather the longer-term dynamics which create the desire to 
seek political change and make use of terrorism as the method of violence to do so. As such, 
the direct causes of terrorism are the factors which positively encourage resistance to the state 
and make terrorism a viable method to achieve this. These include:  
 
1. The existence of grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population. 
2. A lack of opportunity for political participation to address these grievances. 
3. A dissatisfied group within the elite, which is able to make use of these grievances 
within the subgroup to perpetuate its own relevance and cause.162  
Where these preconditions exist, terrorism becomes an attractive strategy for groups or actors 
of differing ideological standpoints to challenge the state’s authority. However, these 
conditions do not address the choice to engage in transnational terrorism, as they depict a clear 
relationship between state and non-state actors, leaving very little room for a third state actor.  
 
Crenshaw elaborates that actors which choose to engage in terrorism can be divided into 
categories depending on their objectives. Actors can be revolutionary in that they seek to 
overthrow a government, nationalist in that they seek to achieve the withdrawal of foreign 
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influence from their home country, reformists seeking to disrupt and discredit the processes of 
government, or a variety of other classifications, dependent on their overall objective or goal.163 
As such, a ‘terrorist’ organisation is not an identity in and of itself, but is linked to the decision 
to use terrorist tactics to achieve a defined goal. Terrorist groups are also highly adaptive in 
their tactics, based on what will best achieve their objectives.164 When a terrorist attack takes 
place outside the home country of the terrorist group, or involves victims or targets from a 
second country; the decision to carry out a transnational attack must serve to achieve or partly 
achieve a desired objective. 165 
 
Here, a transnational terrorist organisation must have identified the benefit of engaging in 
transnational activity in order to achieve a particular objective. Within this framework, Al 
Shabaab straddles both the revolutionary and nationalist categories; drivers for its transnational 
activity fits most easily in the latter, whereby conducting attacks in countries intervening in the 
conflict in Somalia, specifically Djibouti and Kenya, is likely to serve to discourage their 
presence in Somalia.   
  
3.3 Key components   
The rational choice model assumes the following regarding transnational terrorist actors:  
1. Possess stable and consistent (political) goals. 
2. Weigh the anticipated benefits of terrorist action against the expected costs of available 
options of action.  
3. Select the option with the optimum expected utility.166 
 
These political goals should be encoded in the political platform and stated objectives of the 
terrorist organisation. A terrorist organisation will make use of transnational terror as a method 
of violence when it is the most viable option to achieve the highest obtainable goal. As such, 
the choice to use transnational terror tactics is based on their political effectiveness relative to 
alternatives in achieving the organisation’s goals.167 The continuation of terrorism as a 
mechanism of violence should then be based on its demonstrated effectiveness in achieving or 
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partly achieving some of the organisation’s goals.168 In accordance with the rational model, an 
organisation employs terrorism when alternatives will not achieve the designated and relatively 
consistent objectives of the group to a greater degree. The use of transnational terror should 
thus relate either to a transnational goal or have the requisite impact to achieve a domestic goal.  
 
3.4 Al Shabaab as a rational actor  
Since its inception, Al Shabaab has advocated a nationalist agenda, with the objective of 
overthrowing the Ethiopia-backed TFG and, later, the FGS. Al Shabaab also sought to establish 
an Islamic state in Somalia. In line with this nationalist objective, the group has sought to rid 
Somalia of foreign control. Defeating foreign troops in Somalia served to support its nationalist 
aim. The TFG and the FGS were not only seen by the group as illegitimate but as dependent 
on foreign support for their existence.  
 
Despite remaining focused on its domestic objectives, specifically the overthrow of the current 
administration, Al Shabaab demonstrated both the intent and the capacity to conduct attacks 
outside of Somalia after 2008; this was most clearly demonstrated by the July 2010 Kampala 
bombings and the attack against the affluent Westgate shopping complex in Nairobi’s Westlake 
suburb in September 2013. These attacks have been accompanied by an increasingly 
transnational rhetoric, with the group publically threatening to and subsequently conducting 
attacks outside Somalia. The group has since claimed further attacks in Kenya and Djibouti, 
proclaiming that these were carried out in retaliation for these countries’ respective military 
involvement and contribution to counter-insurgency operations in Somalia.169 
 
In 2008, Al Shabaab adopted rhetoric more strongly reflective of a transnational conflict. In an 
audio recording in April of that year, Al Shabaab declared that its enemies were no longer 
confined to local warlords and the ‘apostate’ government.170 States intervening in the conflict 
were also deemed enemies, as was the US, in line with the group’s growing relationship with 
Al Qaeda.171 It is evident that by 2008, Al Shabaab had at least two identifiable objectives 
ordered in degree of importance:  
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1. Nationalist goals with regard to defeating the Somali government. 
2. The establishment of an Islamic state in Somalia. 
 
Under ideal conditions, Al Shabaab’s actions should endeavour to achieve the group’s 
nationalist goals as its primary objective. However, in accordance with the Rational Choice 
Model, due to surrounding circumstances the group has had to assess the available avenues 
through which this could be achieved. Having faced severe losses in Mogadishu and Kismayo, 
the group did not possess the requisite capability to combat Somali government forces that had 
been bolstered by AMISOM and Kenyan troops. As a rational actor, Al Shabaab had to 
strategise an achievable path that would assist in the attainment of its ultimate goal. As such, 
the group would need to weaken its opponent, most directly by reducing its foreign support. 
Unable to match these foreign actors in conventional conflict on the ground in Somalia, an 
alternative was to discourage these actors from providing support. These difficulties are 
identifiable in the period between March and August 2008 and are most starkly illustrated by 
Al Shabaab’s public declaration of allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2012, which has facilitated the 
group in its efforts to attack foreign targets.172 
 
While it is evident that the group increased its transnational agenda, with attacks in Uganda, 
Kenya and Djibouti, it maintained its insurgent campaign at home. Al Shabaab did not deviate 
too far from its overall objectives; from the group’s perspective, this could be seen as an 
effective strategy to achieve its ultimate nationalist goal. The Rational Choice Model is able to 
show a clear process in which Al Shabaab has employed the use of transnational terrorism as 
a method of violence in an effort to rid Somalia of foreign actors. Battle fatigue and 
overstretched resources among the AMISOM troops by 2012 saw AMISOM commanders 
hesitant to push on from recaptured territory, choosing to consolidate control over held 
territories.173 This tactical failure allowed Al Shabaab to regroup in southern Somalia, and in 
mid-2013 there was a surge in domestic terrorist attacks by the group, specifically in 
Mogadishu. These included an attack on the Mogadishu High Court (April 2013), UN 
compound in Mogadishu (June 2013) and the Turkish Embassy building (August 2013), a 
                                                 
172 Adlini Ilma Ghaisany Sjah, “Tracing Al Shabaab’s decision to cooperate with Al Qaeda in Somalia”, 6. 
173 Anderson and McKnight, “Kenya at war: Al Shabaab and its enemies in Eastern Africa”, 14. 
43 
 
month before the September 2013 Westgate attack.174 The targets of these attacks are clear, 
namely, the FGS and interests of the foreign presence in the country.  
The FGS remains heavily dependent on AMISOM and KDF troops for its legitimacy and 
authority through the control of force in Somalia. If these transnational attacks have the desired 
effect of prompting AMISOM-contributing countries to pull out of Somalia, the operating 
environment in Somalia may once again be conducive to achieving Al Shabaab’s primary goal.  
From a rational perspective, in order to achieve its primary objective of overthrowing the FGS, 
Al Shabaab would need to secure local support in order to hold on to regions under its control 
and extend beyond them. Evidence from the period between 2006 and 2007 shows that Al 
Shabaab pursued public support in its efforts against the TFG as part of its successes for the 
UIC.175 Al Shabaab offered a more stable alternative to the warlord structure in place, 
specifically in Mogadishu.176 In return, local communities supported Al Shabaab’s efforts. 
Furthermore, through its anti-TFG agenda, Al Shabaab garnered the support of the Hawiye 
clan, which saw the Ethiopia-backed TFG as favouring the Majeerteen-Rahawin alliance.177 
 
Yet Al Shabaab soon faced significant domestic challenges, not only with the bolstering foreign 
troop presence and successes of the AMISOM operations from 2007, but also with the 
emergence of cleavages within its top leadership under Godane as early as 2008, which 
threatened to splinter the group. In addition, public support in Al Shabaab-held areas was 
waning, as the group’s style of governance came into conflict with local customary authorities 
and had become increasingly violent. At this point, Al Shabaab had adopted a predominantly 
Salafi character, which was not widely welcomed. Indicative of this, towards the end of 2008 
there emerged a counter-militant Islamic movement, from the previously purely political Ahlu 
Sunna wal Jamaa (ASWJ); the group challenged Al Shabaab’s Salafist approach, claiming that 
it excluded other schools of Islam, particularly that of Sufi beliefs, to which the ASWJ 
subscribed.178 ASWJ challenged areas under Al Shabaab’s control and was supported by clan 
allegiances. Al Shabaab’s legitimacy, garnered by bringing greater stability to parts of the 
country, was also waning given the continuing violence in the country. A coinciding dynamic, 
which is likely to have led to a further decline in popular support for Al Shabaab, was the 
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increased targeting of civilians in Al Shabaab attacks. According to data from the GTD,179  
between October 2007 and February 2008 military interests were the primary targets in attacks; 
however, between April 2008 and August 2008, this shifted to primarily civilian interests.180 
 
In addition, on 1 May 2008, then-leader of Al Shabaab, Aden Hashi ‘Ayro, was killed in a US-
led airstrike.181 Following ‘Ayro’s death, Ahmed Abdi Aw-Mohamed Godane was declared 
the group’s new leader.182 Under Godane, Al Shabaab became more closely aligned with Al 
Qaeda, while simultaneously struggling to achieve its nationalist objectives. Whereas Ayro had 
emphasised the nationalist and anti-Ethiopian agenda, never specifically making reference to 
Osama Bin Laden, Godane’s approach was the opposite.183 In Godane’s statements, he alluded 
to and at times outwardly declared allegiance to then-Al Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden, 
before officially declaring the group’s allegiance to Al Qaeda in August 2012.184  With the 
waning of local support, it can be argued that Al Shabaab sought to secure backing from Al 
Qaeda.   
 
Al Shabaab’s proximity to Al Qaeda, particularly under Godane, epitomised the trajectory of 
‘sacralisation’. The sacralisation of a conflict allows for religion (more specifically, the militant 
interpretation thereof) to evolve from what was previously a secondary factor at the onset of 
the conflict, to a primary one.185 Here, in a conflict originally caused by factors other than 
religion, religion becomes increasingly useful in advancing the actor’s position. Given that Al 
Qaeda’s ideology includes both a domestic and transnational fight, by corollary, as an Al Qaeda 
affiliate, Al Shabaab was compelled to expand its own focus beyond its domestic agenda.186 
With regard to Al Shabaab, it is evident that the group’s objectives had shifted from a more 
nationalist agenda to a global jihadist ideology.187 Furthermore, a sacralised conflict limited 
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the potential for a negotiated settlement due to the limited space for political compromise, given 
the newly espoused pious agenda. As a result of limited resources to wage conventional warfare 
and a desire to target foreign actors, transnational terrorism became a viable option and Al 
Shabaab began to operate outside of Somalia. However, this was not within a stable framework 
of objectives. Rather, external factors, including a leadership change, came to impact the intent 
and direction of the group. Al Shabaab’s relationship with Al Qaeda also continued to 
strengthen; in February 2012, Godane appeared in a joint video with latest Al Qaeda head, 
Ayman Al Zawahiri, affirming Al Shabaab’s allegiance to the group.188  
 
This allegiance has proven beneficial to the group’s emerging transnational goals and is 
understood to have secured tactical training, funding, and recruitment networks. Since its 
declaration of allegiance to Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab has adopted tactics which mimic those of Al 
Qaeda, including a greater use of suicide bombers, IEDs and roadside bombings. These 
methods became more prevalent between 2010 and 2011.189 
It is evident that developments in Somalia and within Al Shabaab (at a sub-unit level) affected 
the group and its actions. Al Shabaab has an inherent capacity to transform itself. Al Shabaab 
following the loss of Kismayo in 2012 is very different to Al Shabaab between 2007 and 
2008.190 The Rational Choice Model reveals the transient nature of Al Shabaab as a 
transnational actor which is subject to the surrounding conditions, rather than one chained to 
stable objectives.  
This approach does not fully explain the entrenched operational presence that Al Shabaab has 
established in Kenya which, given the outlined rationality behind the transnational attacks, is 
not necessary. If the objective of transnational terrorism falls in line with the transnational fight 
against states contributing to the war in Somalia, the overarching objective remains domestic, 
and as Al Shabaab gains any upper hand on the domestic front, the group will likely shift focus 
back to its nationalist goals. An entrenched presence in Kenya divides the group geographically 
and, within a group which has already dealt with internal factions, could lead to the splitting 
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and weakening of the group. A presence in Kenya does not reflect a strengthening of the group 
in a conventional sense, as Al Shabaab is not capturing and holding territory within Kenya.  
 
Furthermore, through the aforementioned process of tracing Al Shabaab’s relationship with Al 
Qaeda, the distinct leadership change between ‘Ayro and Godane emerges as a likely 
intervening variable in Al Shabaab’s transformation. While the model requires us to assume 
that Al Shabaab is a unitary rational actor, it is evident that the preferences of Godane may 
have greatly influenced the shift towards a more global (or regional) agenda. The leadership 
purge that Al Shabaab underwent in 2013 created a smaller but not necessarily weaker 
organisation, having shown no sign of diminished capacity in the wake of the 2013 Mogadishu 
attacks. This is likely to have made Al Shabaab easier to direct in accordance with Godane’s 
objectives.  
Finally, if indeed this shift to transnational attacks is a result of a cost/benefit analysis, for the 
achievement of a transnational fight against states contributing to the war in Somalia, it is worth 
noting the apparent lack of Al Shabaab attacks in Ethiopia, which has been identified as the 
key backer of the TFG and FSG and as a former key opponent of Al Shabaab in Somalia. While 
Al Shabaab has iterated a clear intent to target the country, the level of reported Al Shabaab 













                                                 





Chapter 4: Spill-over Conflict  
4. 1 Introduction  
The organisational approach equates a terrorist organisation to all other organisations, ranging 
from corporate to communal; here, the overarching aim of any action is always the survival of 
the organisation itself. As such, it is not the political objectives of the group as a political actor 
which come to determine the actions of the group, but rather the organisational demands to 
ensure its survival. These demands emanate largely from the external context in which the 
organisation exists. Accordingly, a group’s actions, including engaging in transnational 
terrorism, are not necessarily a direct reflection of the group’s ideology or political objectives, 
but are necessitated by the need to ensure the survival of the group.192  
 
4.2 The theory 
The shift from domestic terror to transnational terror may indeed be a consequence of 
surrounding factors in the country of origin. For Napps and Enders, transnational terrorist 
attacks are often conducted in response to shocks to the domestic environment in which the 
group operates. Here, a transnational terrorist attack is an indicator of spill-over violence.193 
Broadly speaking, spill-over effects comprise the consequences of a civil conflict; the overall 
premise is that civil conflicts create new tensions through their effects, one of the most 
prominent of which is the mass influx of refugees into a neighbouring territory.194 Here, 
subsequent conflict is a result of the unintended spill over of a civil strife and a neighbour’s 
efforts to prevent or limit the detrimental impact within their own territory.195 According to 
Michael Scott Doran, transnational terrorism relates to a civil conflict taking place elsewhere 
and, as such, these attacks can be defined within a broader approach to the notion of spill-over 
conflict.196 
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For Halvard Buhaug and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, there is a definitive ‘neighbourhood’ 
dynamic to armed conflict.197 Gleditsch in particular posits that there are transnational factors 
between neighbouring states which can impact the risk of violent civil conflict.198 In turn, the 
risk of civil war is not determined solely by a country’s domestic characteristics.199 While the 
studies into the mechanisms by which this interaction takes place are in no way exhausted or 
conclusive, Salehyan and Gleditsch have highlighted the role of population movements as an 
important mechanism through which a conflict can spread beyond the primary area of violence, 
including to neighbouring countries.200 This is exacerbated by the tendency for protracted 
refugee situations, characterised by extended periods of exile, to occur in the most proximate 
hosts.201 
 
Gleditsch argues that the presence of refugees from neighbouring countries leads to an 
increased probability of violence, suggesting that refugees are one important source of conflict 
spread.202 This manifests as the direct introduction of combatants, arms or the ideologies of 
armed groups in the civil strife into the neighbouring state. A second manifestation is the 
provision of logistical support to the domestic affiliates. A third manifestation concerns a 
negative externality in which the influx of refugees alters the community/ethnic/religious or 
ideological dynamic in the host country, resulting in local discontent between refugee and 
domestic communities.203 Many host states seek to contain the impact of an influx of refugees 
by hosting refugee camps in isolated, remote border regions.204 However, this can serve to 
facilitate associated security concerns in host countries which neighbour the conflict-affected 
state.  
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While many studies have identified a link between an increase in refugees and the spread of 
civil war,205 certain studies have also found a link between hosting refuge communities and an 
increase in other political violence, including terrorism. In their study on the consequences of 
hosting refugee populations, Seung-Whan Choi and Idean Salehyan found that countries which 
host large refugee populations are more likely to experience both domestic and transnational 
terrorism.206  
 
According to Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida, spill-over violence can take the form of 
transnational terrorist attacks, through what they define as contagion terrorism.207 This 
paradigm posits that domestic terrorist attacks may in turn lead to further violence through a 
process of imitation.208 Again, Napps and Ender find that Sub-Saharan Africa (which in their 
study includes Somalia) proved to be particularly vulnerable to the effects of contagion due to 
the presence of a number of weak states and significant population movements through poorly 
secured and porous borders.209 These factors, specifically population movement, are 
exacerbated during times of conflict. In the context of conflict in Somalia and the subsequent 
spill-over effects (including refugee movement) into neighbouring countries, the region proves 
highly conducive to the contagion of terrorism. Transnational terrorism is thus seen as the 
regionalisation of a domestic dispute occurring in another country.210 
 
4.3 Key components 
The spill-over violence model assumes the following regarding (conflict) terrorist actors: 
  
1. The domestic environment of a country engaged in civil war impacts a neighbouring 
state. 
2. This occurs most prominently through population movement. 
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In this instance, population movements result in the diffusion of a conflict from the origin 
country to a host country. The ideologies and goals of belligerents involved in the original 
conflict come to encompass dynamics of the host country, which in turn is impacted by the 
violence. When applied to the actions of a terrorist group in which, by definition, the target and 
the victim of attacks are separate,211 attacks outside of its country of origin are a consequence 
of available opportunity as a result of these spill-over dynamics rather than a rational choice.  
 
4.4 Spill-over conflict in Somalia   
As outlined in Chapter 2, Somalia has been in a near-constant state of conflict since the fall of 
Siad Barre in 1991. The two year civil war allowed for the militarisation of society through the 
proliferation of arms. In the absence of the central state, these faction militias became the 
providers of security at a sub state level. Furthermore, after more than two decades of instability 
in Somalia, there are 967,200 registered Somali refugees living abroad. These refugee 
populations are hosted by Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Uganda, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea and 
Tanzania.212 Kenya hosts the most refugees, with 420,199, followed by Ethiopia with 
249,012.213  
 
Despite years of conflict, the failure of the TFG in consolidation a central state, coupled with 
the ongoing presence of external forces, enabled the resurgence of an independent Al Shabaab 
from 2006.214 As before, the use of armed militias were deemed requisite to maintain authority 
and well as offer security provision. However, this also represented a further militarisation of 
Somalia’s society.215 The use of violence had become synonymous with both dealing with 
conflict and security provision amid a general rise of criminality among armed groups.216 
Another significant consequence was the creation of a protracted refugee crisis.  
 
Prior to Somalia’s governmental collapse in 1991, Kenya had adopted a lax refugee policy. 
However, by 1992, the Somali refugee population in Kenya had grown significantly, reaching 
                                                 
211 Refer to Chapter 2 for a review of the definition of terrorism.  
212 “Refugees in the Horn of Africa”, The UN Refugee Agency; http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/regional.php  
213 “Refugees in the Horn of Africa”, The UN Refugee Agency; http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/regional.php  
214 David M Anderson, "Clan Identity and Islamic Identity in Somalia." CEADS Papers Volume 2: 
Somalia (2012): 4. 
215 Anderson, "Clan Identity and Islamic Identity in Somalia."; 4 
216, Lyn Snodgrass, and Philip Arthur Njuguna Mwanika. "Dynamics and Politics of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in Violent Conflicts Arms Control and its Challenges in Somalia." Africa Insight 43, no. 1 (2013). 
51 
 
285,000.217 As the influx of Somali and Sudanese refugees increased amid political crises and 
a devastating drought in those two countries in the 1990s, the Kenyan government advocated 
for a more stringent refugee policy.218 The Kenyan government sought to largely contain 
Somali refugee populations to the Dadaab camps (Ifo, Hagadera and Dagahaley) in the former 
North Eastern province (today’s Garissa County) and, to a lesser extent, to the Kakuma camp 
located in Turkana County.219 In addition, in the 1990s the Kenyan government yielded much 
control of the administration of the camps to the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR).220 This came to reflect Kenya’s asylum policy of ‘abdication’ and 
‘containment’.221 This abdication was a direct contradiction of the principle that primary 
responsibility for refugees lies with the host state. As a result, a wide range of tasks for the 
administration of the camps fell to the UNHCR. Although the influx of refugees into Kenya 
stabilised in 1995, by 2007, with the rise of Al Shabaab in Somalia, refugee numbers in Kenya 
again increased. This influx followed a decline in available UNHCR funding for the camps. 
UNHCR’s available global budget in 2002 was reduced by USD 19 million.222 These dynamics 
put severe pressure on the Dadaab camp, as well as the surrounding locality. Although this 
policy failure was set to be rectified with the passing of the 2006 Refugee Act, which provided 
for a Department of Refugee Affairs, the implementation of the act fell short.223 Under the 
containment policy, refugees from Somalia were required to reside in the designated camps; 
this requirement was not addressed or altered in the Refugee Act.  
 
Since 1993, the Kenyan administration has continually justified its refugee policy, claiming 
that the 1991 influx had overwhelmed the country’s refugee management infrastructure, 
forcing an encampment policy. In addition, government rhetoric reflected notions that the 
refugee population would inherently put strain on domestic communities, while being a 
potential threat to national security. Although the first justification held true to a degree, the 
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refugee population was largely stable between 1992 and 2004, and the latter requires further 
examination in light of Al Shabaab’s regionalisation through these camps.  
 
The Dadaab refugee camp is located approximately 80km from the border with Somalia, and 
the wider region hosts a large Somali Kenyan population. Since its establishment, the camp’s 
population has continued to swell and as of April 2015, was at approximately 600,000 
residents. The Somali refugee situation in Kenya has become a protracted crisis; some of the 
residents are third-generation refugees, having never travelled to Somalia.224 The funding crisis 
felt since the mid-1990s has resulted in an UNHCR policy to maintain minimum standards in 
the increasingly overpopulated camp. Accordingly, the Dadaab camp offers a conducive 
environment for refugee militarisation. Firstly, it is close to the border of Somalia and to the 
source of the original conflict and where community level militarization had proliferated since 
the civil war. Secondly, it has developed into a protracted refugee crisis, which is more 
vulnerable to refugee militarisation. Finally, the deteriorating security standards at the camp 
amid the funding crisis have facilitated militant infiltration together with increased smuggling 
and banditry networks between Kenya and Somalia.225 
 
Although the Kenyan government initially sought to securitise the Dadaab camp, security 
levels at the camp deteriorated as a result of the ensuing funding crisis due to the protracted 
nature of the refugee crisis. In addition, the proliferation of small arms and an increase in 
terrorism have been seen as direct consequences of the influx of Somali refugees. This 
sentiment holds true today, with the current Kenyatta administration issuing an ultimatum 
calling for the repatriation of the 600,000 Somalis in the Dadaab refugee complex following 
the April 2015 Garissa University College attacks.226  
 
The link between Islamist militants and the Dadaab refugee camp can be traced back as early 
as 2002, when US intelligence sources traced an attack in Mombasa to AIAI; the perpetrators 
reportedly sought safety in Dadaab.227 The camp is also perceived as a recruitment ground for 
Al Shabaab, with recruits able to travel a short distance across the porous border. Al Shabaab’s 
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largest presence in Kenya is reportedly in areas close to the Somali border.228 State security 
control along the border has been historically weak and sporadic, allowing for the high influx 
of refugees into Kenyan territory. However, counties along the Somali border rely on cross-
border trade, which has also facilitated covert cross-border activity by Al Shabaab militants 
outside of the confined refugee camps.229  
 
Despite these claims, there are no official reports of forced recruitment in the Dadaab camp. 
Anecdotal reports and a 2009 investigation by the international NGO and human rights 
advocacy group, Human Rights Watch, suggest that Al Shabaab has actively recruited 
members from Dadaab.230 With little improvement made to security provision at the camp since 
then, such networks have likely continued. While Al Shabaab’s evident infiltration of Kenya’s 
refugee community demonstrated the strategic use of refugees in war and served to illustrate 
the spill over of Somalia’s domestic conflict into Kenya, these recruits are likely to form foot-
soldiers for the organisation and do not necessarily translate into the regionalisation of Al 
Shabaab’s terrorism campaign, which required a higher degree of coordination beyond 
bolstering recruits on the ground in Somalia. According to the UN Monitoring Group on 
Somalia in 2010, the leaders of Al Shabaab and other Islamist organisations travel to Nairobi 
with greater freedom and frequency than to Dadaab. The Nairobi suburb of Eastleigh, in 
particular, is believed to hold Al Shabaab sympathisers; it is not purely the presence of Al 
Shabaab supporters or recruits in refugee camps which have facilitated Al Shabaab operations 
in Kenya.  
 
The domination of and competition between sub-national organisations since the fall of Barre 
have severely impacted the survival of a national government in Somalia and created a 
protracted refugee crisis outside of the country. Yet, this refugee crisis has been ongoing for 
several decades and does not provide sufficient explanation as to why the rise in transnational 
activity by Al Shabaab took place over five years since the group’s formation. Rather, these 
transnational attacks increased in frequency following Kenya’s independent intervention in 
Somalia. Furthermore, refugee camps have not been the sites of the greatest recorded logistical 
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activity of Al Shabaab operatives, which have been traced to the urban centres of Nairobi and 
Mombasa. In addition, with Ethiopia hosting the second-largest number of Somali refugees 
and Tanzania also hosting a sizeable population, the lack of associated Al Shabaab 




Al Shabaab attacks against Kenya have been linked to Kenya’s independent intervention in the 
conflict in Somalia, particularly following the launch of ‘Operation Linda Nchi’ in October 
2011.231 Here, the conflict within one state, in the form of the Al Shabaab insurgency in 
Somalia, generates new issues of contention.232 For example, the insurgency in Somalia was a 
threat to security along Kenya’s border, promoting the state to intervene.233 However, this 
intervention drummed up Al Shabaab’s intent to target Kenyan interests, prompting an 
externalisation of the conflict into Kenyan territory, with Al Shabaab subsequently conducting 
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Chapter 5: Regional War Complex  
5.1 Introduction  
For Gersovitz and Kriger, there is a need to distinguish between civil wars (which may or may 
not come to impact neighbouring countries) and regional war complexes.235 The latter 
emphasises the interdependence between all states which are affected by a civil conflict.  The 
inherent interconnectivity between these states may facilitate not only the spread of conflict, 
but the regionalisation of terrorism. The spread of terrorism, from this perspective, is not purely 
the objective of the actor, nor is it a product of shocks within the actor’s domestic environment. 
Rather, it stems from wider and entrenched regional dynamics through which an actor involved 
in the conflict must navigate.  
 
5.2 The theory 
According to Gersovitz and Kriger, a civil war is defined as, “a politically organised, large-
scale, sustained, physically violent conflict that occurs within a country principally among 
large/numerically important groups of its inhabitants or citizens over the monopoly of physical 
force from within the country”.236 However, a conflict moves away from this definition with 
the involvement of ‘foreign’ actors which are not citizens or inhabitants of the country in which 
the conflict takes place. These foreign actors become key participants in a conflict through the 
provision of fighters, arms, bases or other forms of assistance. In a regional war complex, the 
ratio of domestic to foreign participation equalises or even tips in favour of foreign 
participation. This high level of foreign participation must be sufficient to challenge the 
government’s monopoly of force. Accordingly, a regional war complex is defined as, “a 
politically organised, large-scale, sustained, physically violent conflict among large groups of 
inhabitants or citizens of more than one country, and in at least one of these countries, at least 
two groups of inhabitants or citizens must be bona fide contenders for the monopoly of physical 
force”.237 The regionalisation of an armed conflict can be understood as either the geographical 
diffusion of conflict to a new territory or as an escalation of violence within the original 
territory, which draws in new actors.238 As such, a conflict is not limited to only two distinct 
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actors; rather, there is a multiplicity of actors and tend to have a trans-border scope.239In her 
study of the conditions required for the development of regional conflict systems, Nadine 
Ansorg identifies at least four conditions which lead to a regional war complex.240 These 
include:  
 
1. Economic networks sustained through the support of neighbouring countries. 
2. An intervention on the part of a government.  
3. Militarised refugees. 
4. A non-salient regional identity of a belligerent group.  
 
In their study of transnational terrorism as spill over of domestic disputes elsewhere, Tony 
Addison and Mansoob Murshed found that transnational terrorism comprises, at least, a three-
way interaction involving a government that faces an armed opposition domestically, which 
will spill over in the form of acts of terrorism by the opposition against sponsors or supporters 
of the home government.241 
 
5.3 Key components   
A regional war complex exists when:  
1. There is the involvement of ‘foreign’ actors, which are not citizens or inhabitants of the 
country where the conflict is taking place.  
2. A multiplicity of actors is present.  
3. The participation of foreign actors is high. 
4. At least one of the following conditions must be met;  
a. Economic networks sustained through the support of neighbouring countries. 
b. An intervention on the part of a government.  
c. Militarised refugees. 
d. A non-salient regional identity of a belligerent group.  
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5.4 Al Shabaab in a regional war complex  
The Horn of Africa as regional war complex  
The Horn of Africa conventionally encompasses Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea; 
however, today, literature regarding the region includes Kenya, Uganda and Sudan.242 This is 
supported by the regional bloc, IGAD, of which Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, 
Uganda and Kenya are member states. These states are considered to share not only 
geographical similarities, but social and cultural factors, common religious practices and 
economic linkages.  
 
 However, this interconnectivity includes political linkages whereby the domestic dynamics of 
one state have inextricably influenced its neighbours. The Horn of Africa has among the 
world’s lowest per-capita income, life expectancy and literacy rates, as well as high infant 
mortality rates.243 The region is of strategic importance to global powers as the gate to the Gulf 
of Suez and Suez Canal. In light of these connections,  Gersovitz and Kriger identify the Horn 
of Africa (which they define as including Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and 
Sudan) as a regional war complex.244 
 
The region has been plagued by numerous conflicts which, together with natural disasters such 
as drought and famine, have led to high population movements of refugees and internally 
displaced persons.245 Post-independence government regimes in the region have also been 
characterised by authoritarian leadership which has played on often-politicised ethnic and clan-
based cleavages to muster support. Shared strategic resources, such as the Nile River, have also 
offered opportunity for inter-state competition, often through third-party support for domestic 
adversaries in rival states.246 While the conflicts in Somalia and Somaliland, as well as between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, challenged the fluidity of nation state borders, interventionist foreign 
policy, such as Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia and the sponsoring of proxy forces, 
inherently created trans-border dynamics to conflicts in the region.247 This has been 
compounded by economic interdependence regarding regional strategic resources, the cross-
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cutting nature of intercommunal conflicts, as well as shared regional challenges such as 
drought.248  
 
Since the 1990s, the Horn of Africa has experienced acts of terrorism against both foreign 
interests and domestic populations. Weak governance and poor state security structures in 
Sudan and Somalia, for instance, have offered transnational terrorist organisations a safe 
haven.249 In particular, the absence of a legitimate government following the fall of Siad Barre 
in Somalia together with the country’s extended coastline and proximity to Yemen have made 
it a particularly attractive terrorist host. 
 
As outlined in Chapter 2, Somalia has been in a state of protracted conflict, at least since the 
fall of Barre’s regime. The ensuing conflict, which has taken on many shapes and has come to 
include a myriad of non-state and pseudo-state actors, has also attracted foreign intervention. 
Although faraway actors such as the US intervened in the war in the 1990s, it is the involvement 
of Somalia’s neighbours which has entrenched a regional dynamic to the conflict today and, 
by corollary, the regional dynamic of Al Shabaab’s activity, specifically the involvement of 
Ethiopia and Kenya from 2006 onwards. Kenya’s initial involvement in the conflict was aimed 
at resolving the ensuing crisis and sought to re-establish governance in Somalia, holding a 
reconciliatory process which extended for two years between 2002 and 2004, producing the 
TFG.250 In doing so, Kenya inevitably became embroiled in Somalia’s crisis. Kenya also hosted 
the TFG until 2006 before it was relocated to Baidoa. 
 
At the time, the UIC was able to bring a degree of stability to Mogadishu, to the aversion of 
the TFG, which was recognised as the legitimate authority in Somalia. The 2006 Ethiopian 
intervention in Somalia against the UIC not only accentuated the disintegration of the Somali 
state by re-emphasising clan-based allegiances through the perception that the Ethiopia-backed 
TFG favoured the Majeerteen-Rahawin alliance, but allowed Al Shabaab to swell around a 
compelling narrative of a foreign presence in Somalia.251 While Ethiopia tried to engage both 
the TFG and UIC in talks in Khartoum aimed at forging a unity government, the pushback by 
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the UIC resulted in direct military engagement between Ethiopia and the UIC towards 
Baidoa.252 Following the fighting, more radical elements within the UIC, which would later go 
on to form Al Shabaab’s leadership base, called for a holy jihad against predominantly 
Christian Ethiopia.253 
 
However, it was the Kenyan and Ethiopian interventions in 2011 which really served to 
transform Al Shabaab’s domestic agenda to a regional one and were likely drives of Al 
Shabaab’s use of transnational terror. Operation Linda Nchi was not a kneejerk response on 
Kenya’s part. In his study of foreign intervention in Somalia, Brian Hesse highlights a 
significant transition within Kenya’s foreign military operations. While in the early 2000s 
Kenya had been among the top ten troop contributing countries to UN peacekeeping missions 
globally, this number declined by 2005, coinciding with an uptick in US anti-terrorism 
assistance.254 It appeared as though the Kenyan military was gearing itself towards combating 
a very specific enemy on its next intervention mission. The main objectives of Operation Linda 
Nchi were to establish a security buffer zone between Kenya and Somalia and to recapture the 
port of Kismayo, in order to suffocate Al Shabaab’s revenue sources. However, some 
commentators argue that the move was far more strategic, and was aimed to secure maritime 
trading for Ethiopia and the Lamu Port Southern Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor, a link 
between Kenya’s Lamu port and South Sudan’s oilfields. This motivated the intervention 
despite likely retaliation by Al Shabaab. 
 
Following suit, Ethiopia (re)entered Somalia in November 2011, having withdrawn from the 
country in 2009. Although both the KDF and Ethiopian contingents went on to join the 
AMISOM operations, these independent operations singled them out as independent foreign 
actors in the conflict.  
 
Since 2011, there has been a rise in the number of attacks targeting AMISOM and Kenyan 
positions within Somalia.255 There has also been a marked increase in the number of attacks in 
Kenya, with isolated and attempted attacks taking place in Ethiopia and Djibouti (an AMISOM 
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troop-contributing country and host to the US military base Camp Lemonnier). In accordance 
with the Regional War Complex Model, there is identifiable intent on the part of Al Shabaab 
to carry out attacks outside of Somalia, driven by this regional dynamic. However, such attacks 
are contingent on two additional factors: capabilities and opportunity. Opportunities for 
terrorist attacks can be fleeting, and are heavily dependent on the surrounding environment.  
 
The interconnectivity provided by the Regional War Complex Model allows for domestic 
factors within the targeted countries to be taken into account. This is particularly useful in 
addressing the discrepancy between the number of Al Shabaab attacks in Kenya relative to the 
number in Ethiopia, given the equal intent to target these countries. This is likely related to the 
presence of local supporters of Al Shabaab in Kenya and Ethiopia, respectively. Initially, it 
appears that Al Shabaab has been able to carry out more attacks in Kenya because it has the 
capacity to do so. Looking at Somalia, this could initially be explained by the fact that Al 
Shabaab held more territory along the southern border with Kenya than the western border with 
Ethiopia. However, an additional dynamic has been the rise of Al Shabaab support among 
Kenyan nationals. In her study on the radicalisation of Kenyan youths, Anneli Botha found that 
a significant portion of individuals involved in Al Shabaab attacks outside of Somalia’s borders 
were not Somali nationals.256 Although Al Shabaab has a history of hosting foreign fighters 
due to its allegiance with Al Qaeda and this could speak to the role of international Islamists, 
there has been a marked increase in the number of supporters originating from East Africa.257 
In line with the regional war complex dynamic, Botha’s study moves away from the notion that 
Somalia is the root cause of insecurity in the Horn of Africa to uncover some interesting 
dynamics in Kenya which contribute to Al Shabaab’s regional activities.  
 
In January 2012 the Al Katai’ib Foundation media outlet released a video in which Sheikh 
Ahmed Iman Ali introduced himself as the new leader of Al Hijra.258 Al Hijra formed part of 
the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC), which was initially formed in 2008 as an informal advocacy 
group focused on voicing the socio-economic grievances of Muslim communities in Kenya, 
particularly those of unemployed youths. The MYC had established branches in Nairobi, 
Mombasa and Garissa. However, Al Hijra’s ideology was heavily influenced by Sheikh Aboud 
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Rogo, an open Al Shabaab sympathiser. In February 2012, the group declared allegiance to Al 
Shabaab.259 Despite this declaration, the group’s rhetoric has remained distinctly domestic, 
reflecting an intention to bring jihad to Kenya. Coinciding with the formation of Al Hijra, Al 
Shabaab’s rhetoric since 2013 has espoused a Kenyan focus, with references made specifically 
to the ‘Muslims of Kenya’ and ‘bringing war to Kenya’.260 Kenya’s security response to this 
threat has served to further stoke this anti-Kenya rhetoric regarding the Kenyan government 
among Al Hijra supporters. Since 2012, Al Hijra supporters and sympathisers have been 
rounded up in mass arrests targeting mosques, specifically in Mombasa. There have also been 
reports of assassinations by unidentified perpetrators targeting 21 Muslim clerics in Mombasa, 
which Al Hijra has claimed were orchestrated by government forces.261  
 
From a rational perspective, domestic resources facilitated Al Shabaab’s transnational 
campaign based on Al Shabaab’s agenda. However, the foundations for the radicalisation of 
Muslim youths in Kenya have a much broader history.262 Although radicalisation manifests at 
a personal level, there is evidence of broader dynamics which come to impact the radicalisation 
process. Studies into radicalisation find that involvement in terrorist acts is not a brash 
phenomenon, but stems from the gradual exposure and socialisation towards more radical 
behaviour, in which terrorism becomes a viable method of violence.263 This is particularly acute 
when extremism is able to manifest around issues that concern the wider community. 
According to Botha, drivers of radicalisation in Kenya have included real and perceived 
political and socio-economic marginalisation among the country’s Muslim population, which 
comprises approximately 30 percent of the total population. Concerns among the Muslim 
population can be commandeered by extremist organisations, which often specifically target 
more vulnerable sections of a community, including unemployed male youths, in this regard.264 
This can be capitalised on by transnational or international terrorist groups.  Furthermore, the 
actions which the government takes in combating insecurity can also contribute to the 
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radicalisation process. Kenyan authorities have tended to see terrorism as a foreign, imported 
problem, despite evidence suggesting that terrorist attacks in Kenya have tended to involve 
Kenyan nationals.265 Domestic security operations in Kenya have disproportionately targeted 
Muslim nationals, particularly Somali Muslim nationals. This was most clearly demonstrated 
in the controversial ‘Usalama Watch’ operation, comprising security sweeps of Nairobi and 
Mombasa in April 2014. Over 3,000 people were arrested and incarcerated in the Kasarani 
stadium in Nairobi. Despite this, these means fail to address the domestic factors contributing 
to this regional threat. 
 
Yet in reality there have been a multitude of foreign actors involved in the conflict in Somalia, 
ranging from neighbouring countries, to the US, UN and AU members. As such, the conflict 
in Somalia is not easily definable as regional; rather, it is a global conflict. This is reflected in 
Al Shabaab’s rhetoric, which has adopted an increasingly anti-US position, particularly since 
the group’s allegiance with Al Qaeda as well as the continued involvement of the US, UN and 
other international actors in the country. The authority of the FGS extends little beyond 
Mogadishu, and the government’s monopoly of force continues to be challenged, including in 
the capital. The government remains heavily dependent on AMISOM and the conflict within 
Somalia is inherently an international one. As a force multiplier, transnational terrorism allows 
Al Shabaab to threaten its adversaries in the regional playing field, including distant players 
such as the US, as evidenced by the attack in Djibouti City in May 2014, in which three people 
were killed and 15 injured in a suicide bombing targeting a restaurant frequented by US and 
French military personnel.266 Here, foreign nationals were targeted in retaliation for 
occurrences within Somalia, which thus multiplied the group’s perceived capabilities of 
targeting its Western enemies within the Horn of Africa.  
 
Independent interventions by Ethiopia, Kenya and the US prior to the formation of Al Shabaab 
facilitated the formation of a regional war complex which has been exacerbated by more recent 
foreign involvement in Somalia. Al Shabaab’s transnational activity is likely to be part of the 
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broader regional conflict dynamic which has involved Ethiopia, Kenya, the AU, UN and the 
































Chapter 6: Evaluation and Conclusion 
The focus of this study has been to determine the strongest explanation for Al Shabaab’s use 
of transnational terror.  According to Rational Choice Theory, an actor should possess stable 
and consistent (political) goals, weigh the anticipated benefits against the expected costs of 
available options of action, and select the option with the optimum expected utility.267 Yet it is 
evident that Al Shabaab has transformed its objectives over time, moving between nationalist 
and jihadist objectives, rendering the first assumption untrue. Furthermore, with Kenya 
choosing to remain committed to its operations in Somalia, AMISOM renewing its mandate 
for the fight against Al Shabaab, and transnational attacks attracting foreign actors such as the 
US to bolster not only its own counterterrorism capabilities in the region but also those of 
Somalia’s neighbours, for example, these transnational attacks have arguably had the opposite 
effect than that which was intended, which should have called for a change in strategy by the 
group. While acts of transnational terror function as force multipliers for the group, they have 
done little beyond bolstering Al Shabaab’s international reputation in achieving its stated 
objective of ridding Somalia of foreign forces. Having thus failed to meet the first and second 
criteria of evaluation, Rational Choice Theory cannot be seen as the most useful in explaining 
Al Shabaab’s transnational activity.  
 
Nevertheless, what is most identifiable and most clearly demonstrated in the Rational Choice 
Model is that Al Shabaab is adaptable. The Rational Choice Model allowed us to trace the 
transformation of Al Shabaab from its independence in 2007 to the state of the organisation 
following the loss of Kismayo in 2012. From this, we were able to garner that Al Shabaab is a 
dynamic organisation which bends and transforms not only as a result of changes in its 
objectives, but in relation to the environment in which it primarily operates. However, the 
Rational Choice Model fell short in assessing the impacts of leadership change within Al 
Shabaab in 2008. As the theory incorporates collective action by assuming that the group’s 
actions can be equated to the actions of individuals, the model demanded that Al Shabaab be 
understood to be acting as a single entity. Although it is arguable that the preference of the 
leader can be equitable with the preference of the group as a whole, there is an underlying 
possibility that contradictions between the preferences of group members could lead the 
organisation to act more or less in favour of a particular objective. Leadership challenges may 
                                                 
267 Max Abrahams, “What terrorists really want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism strategy", International 
Security 32 (4) (2002) : 86. 
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also lead individuals within the group to take stronger positions. Although beyond the scope of 
this study, there is perhaps a need to examine the shift in leadership dynamics within Al 
Shabaab as an explanation for the organisation’s activities as a whole and what the latest shift 
following the recent death of Godane may mean for Al Shabaab going forward.  
 
The Spill-over model did not provide a strong explanation for the drivers of Al Shabaab’s use 
of transnational terror, largely due to its reliance on anecdotal evidence concerning Al Shabaab 
recruitment within the Dadaab refugee camp. Thus, while the spill-over theory assumption that 
Somalia has been engaged in a domestic conflict which has led to population movements to 
neighbouring countries may hold true, there is a lack of empirical support. Although the study 
chose to focus on the Dadaab refugee camp, it would be beneficial in a future study to compare 
Al Shabaab recruitment from Dadaab and the Dollo Ado refugee located in Ethiopia, the 
country which hosts the second-highest population of Somali refugees. However, while this 
would likely give light to the role of spill-over conflict, a regional war complex approach may 
be best suited for such a study, in order to fully capture the Ethiopia-Somalia dynamic. 
Nevertheless, the Spill-over Model revealed that while refugee recruits may become foot-
soldiers for the organisation, this does not necessarily translate into a driver for the use of 
transnational terror.  
 
The Regional War Complex Theory offered the strongest explanation. We have seen the 
protracted involvement of foreign actors in Somalia, including actors directly engaged in war 
with Al Shabaab within Somali territory. There is a multiplicity of actors which are highly 
engaged in the conflict, deriving from the intervention on the part of a government. This was 
supported by Kenya’s Operation Linda Nchi as well as the presence of US and UN forces in 
Somalia. Specifically, the study explored the notion of Kenya’s growing domestic threat as an 
explanation for the entrenched Al Shabaab presence in Kenya. Although the Rational Choice 
and Regional War Complex models offered insights into Al Shabaab’s intent to use 
transnational terror, it was the group’s capabilities and available opportunities which allowed 
the group to do so. By tracing the domestic support network in Kenya beyond spill-over factors, 
the model revealed that Al Shabaab’s regional activity in Kenya was also dependent on the 
capabilities present within Kenya versus the group’s capabilities elsewhere, such as Ethiopia. 
While this does have implications for the observed low incidence of Al Shabaab attacks in 
Ethiopia, this study failed to fully capture the dynamic of Al Shabaab in Ethiopia. This was a 
consequence of both limited academic resources on the matter and limited public reporting due 
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to high information control regarding attacks against the government and perpetrators thereof 
in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, ostensibly, it appears that Al Shabaab has been able to carry out 
more attacks in Kenya because it has the capacity to do so owning to domestic dynamics. 
 
Each of the three theories discussed provides a degree of insight into Al Shabaab and how the 
organisation operates. Neverthless, it is most evident that no single or unitary explanation can 
be used to fully explain the drivers of Al Shabaab’s use of transnational terror. This is because 
Al Shabaab has assumed a multitude of functions and identities since its inception.268 The group 
operates as both a terrorist organisation and an insurgent group, but has at times provided 
governance to communities in the territories it controlled. Al Shabaab cannot easily be 
understood as a unitary actor and, while it may claim attacks in a unified manner, the 
orchestration of these assaults is likely to be reliant on a multitude of interlocking networks 
which navigate between and within national borders.  
  
Overall, Regional War Complex proved the strongest explanation, while Rational Choice 
Theory most clearly highlighted Al Shabaab’s intent to transform from a domestic actor to a 
regional one, and the Spill-over Model showed that refugees could offer a recruitment source. 
The conflict in Somalia has inherently been an international one, both through the role of 
foreign intervention and the role of international Islam and transnational Islamists. Yet, the 
capabilities which facilitated the attacks in Kenya were not only a consequence of Kenya’s 
involvement in Somalia in combating Al Shabaab, but also the mechanisms through which Al 
Shabaab was able to connect with individuals outside of Somalia that were facilitated by 
domestic factors within Kenya. The shift in the nature of attacks in Kenya witnessed between 
2013 and 2015 shows a growing understanding of local politics, as well as religious and ethnic 
dynamics of localities, through the specific targeting of civilians perceived to be outsiders to 
the community.269 It is likely that Al Shabaab has begun to capitalise on Kenya’s religious and 
ethnic divisions in a distinct shift from its earlier low-level and indiscriminate attacks between 
2012 and 2013. This likely indicates an acute awareness of the domestic and local dynamics 
within Kenya and is indicative of the presence of local recruits within the organisation. The 
distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim targets serves to cement Al Shabaab’s identity 
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outside of Somalia, where the group cannot rely on the Somali versus ‘foreigner’ division, 
allowing the group’s jihadist identity to surpass its nationalist one.  
 
Al Shabaab as a transnational actor should not be seen as a linear transformation of the group, 
moving outwards from Somalia, but as an interlinked web between countries in the Horn of 
Africa, where domestic vulnerabilities such as political and socio-economic marginalisation 
and a vulnerability to radicalisation allow for the cross-pollination of intent, and the capabilities 
to carry out attacks. It is evident that Kenya remains the most prominent target in Al Shabaab’s 
regional campaign, in which a domestic support structure has facilitated the regionalisation of 
the group far more than the group’s intent to do so. Looking ahead, governments will need to 
refocus their counterterrorism policies to encompass more than a military response in a 
neighbouring country.  
 
Looking forward, with the Kenyan government having responded to the April 2015 Garissa 
attack with a blanket approach in line with its previous strategies, and vowing to eliminate Al 
Shabaab in Somalia, a policy shift in the near term in Kenya seems unlikely. There is a clear 
rationale for improving security measures within the refugee complex, as explored in Chapter 
4. Furthermore, the Kenyan government has begun to construct a wall between Kenya and 
Somalia, which is expected to extend some 630km along the porous border, which may indeed 
prevent Somalia-based Al Shabaab supporters conducting cross-border attacks. However, as 
discovered in the exploration of the regional war complex in the Horn of Africa, in order to 
truly counter the Al Shabaab threat it faces, Kenya will need to address its domestic threat, 
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Appendix A  
Clan dynamics in Somalia   
The Somali clan structure is based on a patrilineal lineage type. Genealogies define the kinsmen 
as belonging to certain clans according to the ancestor from whom they stem. This lineage has 
evolved to include a social contract in which individuals find unity and identity within their 
specific clan, above all other identities, including nationalist ones.270 From this, a system of 
customary laws and practices (known as ‘xeer’), which (re)enforce the sovereignty of 
traditional authorities, have become entrenched in Somali society, specific to the different 
clans.271 Clan families are divided by a system of patrilineal descent into clans, primary lineage 
and other sub-divisions contributing to a traceable kinship. Clan elders, known as Guurti, 
represent their clans at the highest political level. This deeply entrenched customary law and 
traditional leadership governs communities independently of modern state structures.272  
 
The population is divided into six major clan families: the Darod, Isaaq, Dir and Hawiye, the 
nomadic-pastoralists known as the ‘noble clans’, as well as the Rahanweyn and Digil, the 
sedentary agro-pastoralists.273 These six clans are further divided into sub-clans, which are 
progressively divided into smaller groups.274 In addition, Somali society hosts groups known 
as ‘the minorities’. These groups, which include the Bantu, Bajunis and Barawanis, are not 
considered to be clans.275 Clans usually control specific territories which have been defined 
over time as a result of nomadic migration circuits.276 In Somali tradition, the rights of groups 
are effectively protected (from rival clans) by force, or the threat of force. Weaker clans and 
subgroups are thus driven to seek protection from stronger clans, entering into alliances with 
them.277 These alliances form a wider social contract to ensure mutual benefits.   
 
In literature on post-colonial Somalia, there is a general consensus that a ‘nationalist’ Somali 
identity emerged and gradually altered existing clan identities. However, this process was 
disrupted by both the Ogaden War (1977-1978) and Siad Barre’s regime, in which Barre 
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politicised the alliances between Marehan, Ogaden and Dhulbahante (M.O.D) clans within 
government leadership positions.278  
 
In the absence of government structure following the fall of Barre’s regime in 1991, these clan 
identities, which surpassed a nationalistic identity for the people of Somalia, were consolidated 
and further legitimised by international bodies attempting to work with clan leadership in order 
to end the political crisis in the country. 
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